

**CONTROLLER'S OFFICE
INTERNAL AUDITS DIVISION**

AND

BUDGET ANALYST'S OFFICE

PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

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**MANAGEMENT AUDIT OF THE
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO'S
911 EMERGENCY SYSTEM**

FEBRUARY 15, 1991

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Honorable Jim Gonzalez
Member, Board of Supervisors
City and County of San Francisco
City Hall Room 235
San Francisco, CA 94102

February 15, 1991

Dear Supervisor Gonzalez:

The Audits Division of the Controller's Office and the Budget Analyst's Office have just completed the management audit of the 911 Emergency System and Police Dispatch System as you requested. The objectives of the audit were:

- to identify current levels of performance and analyze them to see if they are adequate to meet departmental/city goals and objectives;

- to identify issues that enhance or inhibit the providing of services in an efficient and effective manner;

- to analyze current budgeting and staffing levels; and,

- to determine if there are adequate internal management controls.

In addition, we surveyed similar jurisdiction's 911 Systems and developed a matrix of the results.


The audit was conducted as a joint project between the Controller's Audits Division and the Budget Analyst. Dr. Scott Miller, from the Audits Division, was project manager and Mr. Stanton Jones, from the Budget Analyst's Office was project staff.


We want to thank Deputy Chief Fred Lau, Lieutenant Edward Fortner and Sergeant Bill Shoaf for their cooperation in conducting the audit. We also want to thank the Senior Dispatchers and Dispatchers who helped us gain information and who participated in our surveys and interviews.

Details of our findings and recommendations are located in Chapter IV of the report. The findings and recommendations have been reviewed by the Police Department and their response is located in the back of the report starting on page 53.

It is generally the Audit Division's policy to follow up on audit recommendations on a semi-annual basis and we would be happy to do so upon request. Any questions regarding the audit should be forwarded to Young Choi or Scott Miller, Audits Division, Controller's Office, 160 South Van Ness, or call (415) 558-7888.

Sincerely,


Samual D. Yockey
Controller


Harvey M. Rose
Budget Analyst

cc: Supervisor Doris Ward, President
Supervisor Roberta Achtenberg
Supervisor Angela Alioto
Supervisor Harry G. Britt
Supervisor Terence Hallinan
Supervisor Tom Hsieh
Supervisor Willie B. Kennedy
Supervisor Bill Maher
Supervisor Carole Migden
Supervisor Kevin F. Shelley
Mayor Art Agnos
Clerk of the Board of Supervisors
Mayor's 911 Task Force
Mr. Robert Morales, Chair
Police Commission
Mr. Louis J. Giraudo, President
Chief Willis A. Casey
Audits Division Distribution List

1. The purpose of this report is to provide a summary of the results of the study conducted by the research team. The study was designed to investigate the effects of the proposed intervention on the target population. The results of the study are presented in the following sections.

[Signature]
Date: 10/10/2023

Page 1 of 1

The study was conducted in a controlled environment. The participants were recruited from a local community center. The study was approved by the local ethics committee. The results of the study are presented in the following sections.

City and County of San Francisco
Audits Division
Budget Analyst

911 Emergency System Study
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Public Health Department
Bureau of Health

San Francisco Health Department
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1. General Information and Description

2. Description of the Project

3. Objectives and Purpose of the Project

4. Methodology

5. Results and Findings

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

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Chapter I

Executive Summary Recommendation Cross Reference Matrix

A. Executive Summary


The 911 Emergency System and the Police Dispatch System are the first two parts of a three part emergency response process for the City and County of San Francisco (the third part being the actual arrival of emergency units to the scene of the emergency). The 911 System is part of the State mandated system that every county or city in California must follow. The 911 System is operated by the San Francisco Police Department, Technical Services Division, Communications Section. The 911 and Dispatch Systems are operated by civilian dispatchers who are supervised by civilian senior dispatchers. The senior dispatchers report to the Officer-in-Charge of Communications (a Police Lieutenant). There are also a number of sworn support personnel (training, tape/records, technical coordinator, etc.) included in the Communications Section. The Communication Section's total budget for FY 1990-91 is \$7,192,865.

Since there are no official CCSF performance standards for the 911 or Police Dispatch Systems to judge against, it is difficult to objectively evaluate the performance of the 911 in just one word (i.e., excellent, good, fair, poor, satisfactory, etc...). However, the audit does identify a number of key statistics, findings, and recommendations that illustrate the actual operational performances of the 911 and Dispatch Systems.

Statistical findings include:

1. The average time to respond to Priority A (life threatening) calls in 1990 (including dispatch time and travel time) was 6 minutes and forty seconds;
2. The average time calls were on hold for 911 was 2 seconds;
3. The average time calls were on hold for a non-emergency (553-0123) call was 52.1 seconds;
4. The total number of calls for 911 and the non-emergency line (553-0123) in 1990 was 1,158,875. Out of these calls only 16.57% or 192,103 were dispatched as actual emergencies.

The statistics indicate that the average time of two seconds for emergency call answers and 52.1 seconds for non-emergency call answers fall within the range that was provided by other jurisdiction's 911 Centers that were surveyed (see Appendix B). However, some 911 calls still take over ten seconds to answer (which is the "target" seconds as suggested by State of California guidelines).



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In addition to the analysis of statistics, the audit focused on a number of operational and management issues which were developed into findings and recommendations. In general, the auditors found that there is low morale within the Communications unit; that the 911 and Police Dispatch Center facilities are below the standards of other similar jurisdictions; that there is no official performance criteria established in which to evaluate the performance of the unit as a whole or individuals within the unit; that the management structure of the Communications Section needs to be augmented and fully civilianized; and that the discipline process used within the unit needs to be totally revised for more efficient and effective results.

Other findings describe issues including training, goals planning, strategic planning, sworn vs civilian working relationships, recruitment and selection, and interagency coordination. A number of recommendations were developed regarding these findings, which if implemented, would greatly decrease the probability of problems and errors occurring in the Communications Section.

These recommendations are listed in the Recommendations Cross Reference Matrix which follows.

RECOMMENDATION CROSS REFERENCE MATRIX

PAGE	NMBR	RECOMMENDATION	ACTION BY
15	1	Develop mission/goals/objectives	Tech Service Mgt
16	2	Develop organization performance measures	Department Mgt
16	3	Develop staff performance measures	Tech Service Mgt
16	4	Track performance on regular basis	Tech Service Mgt
17	5	Replace sworn manager with civilian manager	Deputy Chief/Admin
17	6	Develop short and long range strategic plans	Tech Service Mgt
18	7	Reaffirm importance of Communications Div.	Chief of Police
18	8	Develop "Order" re:rudeness/subvention/disrespect	Chief of Police
18	9	Develop "Order" re:input from Dispatch	Chief of Police
18	10	Implement NC and NCC repoting procedure	Deputy Chief/Patrol
19	11	Develop training for sworn staff on dispatch role	Police Dept Mgt
19	12	Develop job description for 8239s	Tech Service Mgt
19	13	Reaffirm roles of 8239s	Tech Service Mgt
20	14	Train 8239s in managment/supervisory skills	Tech Service Mgt
20	15	Inform entire SFPD regarding dispatch function	Chief of Police
20	16	OIC become more involved in personnel problems	OIC Communications
20	17	8239s receive more direct supervision from OIC	OIC Communications
20	18	Conduct monthly 8239 meetings	OIC Communications
21	19	Replace sworn positions with new civilian 8240s	Deputy Chief/Admin
22	20	Monitor leave times; cut excessive leave use	OIC Communications
22	21	Enhance organizational standing and morale	Police Dept. Mgt
22	22	Do not grant leave time unless emergency	OIC Communications
24	23	Revise disciplinary process	Chief of Police
25	24	Require high school diploma for 8238 position	Tech Service Mgt
25	25	Require typing capacity of 50 wpm for 8238s	Tech Service Mgt

RECOMMENDATION CROSS REFERENCE MATRIX

PAGE	NMBR	RECOMMENDATION	ACTION BY
25	26	Assign training coord. to do continuing ed.	Tech Service Mgt
25	27	Develop alternative to using 8238s for training	OIC Communications
26	28	Implement training records for 8238s and 8239s	OIC Communications
27	29	Rewrite 8239 performance appraisal report	OIC Communications
27	30	Develop and implement a quality assurance program	Tech Service Mgt
28	31	Solicit input from 8238s and 8239s on decisions	Police Dept. Mgt
28	32	Speed up transfer of parking calls policy change	Chief of Police
29	33	Track and evaluate translation services usefulness	Senior Dispatchers
29	34	Monitor 8238s on a regular basis	Senior Dispatchers
30	35	Develop community supported dispatch standards	Chief of Police
31	36	Have 553-0123 displayed opposite 911 in phonebook	Police Dept. Mgt
31	37	Educate public on proper use of 911	Police Dept. Mgt
31	38	Revise State law to allow other #s on 911 ads	Mayors Office
32	39	Decrease 8238 positions; increase 8239 positions	Tech Service Mgt
33	40	Try to recruit qualified bi-lingual dispatchers	Civil Service
33	41	Support 8238s efforts in learning second languages	Police Dept. Mgt
34	42	Replace sworn staff with civilian 8240 positions	Deputy Chief/Admin
35	43	Increase frequency of 8238 examinations	Civil Service
35	44	Change classes of staff to reflect current duties	Tech Service Mgt
36	45	Solve internal SFPD problems regarding dispatchers	Chief of Police
37	46	Implement 1987 audit recommendations appropriately	Police Dept. Mgt
38	47	Implement 1987 8238 examination recommendation	Civil Service
38	48	Coordinate all CCSF dispatch functions	Mayors Office
39	49	Immediately finish dispatch center improvements	Chief of Police
39	50	Develop long range plan for 911/dispatch facility	Chief of Police
39	51	Develop one control point for communications center's facility/equipment improvements	Chief of Police

Chapter II

Introduction

This management audit of the 911 Emergency System was requested by the San Francisco City and County (CCSF) Mayor and Board of Supervisors. The audit was conducted by the Audits Division of the City Controller's Office and the Budget Analyst's Office of the CCSF Board of Supervisors.

A. Scope and Objectives

The scope and objectives of this audit centered on the management, operations, personnel, staffing and organizational elements of the 911 Emergency System. It also included the San Francisco Police Department's Dispatch System as it relates to the receiving of 911 information and the dispatching of units in response to received calls. Due to the limited time given to conduct the management audit, many areas related to 911 such as Patrol Workforce Distribution, Patrol Response, Patrol Availability for Calls, and Field Supervision while important, were not researched and thus were not specifically addressed in this audit report.

Our audit included an analysis of the information flow from the callers needing help through the 911 system and then to the police dispatchers. Also analyzed were the both the facilities and emotional factors of the 911 Dispatch Center, and certain specific organizational elements of the 911 System and Police Dispatch Systems including:

- mission/goals/objectives
- staffing and budget
- performance standards and actual performance
- recruitment, selection, training and position evaluation issues
- communications workflow within the center
- organization structure (internal and external)
- adherence to California State 911 standards
- unit morale and environment
- public interaction with the 911 system
- planning and budgeting
- civilianization
- communication/coordination with other CCSF dispatch centers

In addition, a matrix of other similar jurisdiction's operations was developed for comparison and analysis.

The objectives of the study were to research findings and make recommendations on:

Identifying current levels of performance and analyzing them to see if they are adequate to meet departmental/city goals and objectives;

What issues exist, that enhance or inhibit the providing of services in an efficient and effective manner;

If current staffing and budgeting levels are adequate to meet the needs of the 911 Emergency System and the Dispatching of Police calls;

If adequate internal management controls are in place.

B. Auditing Statements

This audit was conducted in accordance with US General Accounting Office's Government Auditing Standards for performance audits and also meets San Francisco City and County Internal Audits Standards and Procedures.

This study was conducted solely as a management audit and thus did not review the expenditures or internal controls of any funds, accounts or monies held by or administered by the Technical Services Division or the San Francisco Police Department as a whole.

Within the scope of the study, management internal controls were reviewed and deficiencies are identified within the Findings and Recommendations section of this report.

C. Methodology

The United States General Accounting Office's Government Auditing Standards require a performance/management audit to determine:

Whether the entity is managing and utilizing its resources economically and efficiently;

Identify the causes of inefficiencies or uneconomical practices;

Whether the entity has complied with laws and regulations concerning matters of economy and efficiency;

Whether the designed results or benefits established by the Legislature or other authorizing body, are being achieved;

Whether the agency has considered alternatives that might yield desired results at a lower cost;

To achieve these goals, the Office of the Controller's Audit Division and the Board of Supervisor's Budget Analysts Office used a four step assessment methodology which ensures that the fact gathering, analysis, and report preparation activities are completed in a structured, consistent, and comprehensive manner.

To assure the validity of our reported findings we use audit validity procedures to test the findings we have developed. The findings are also subjected to multiple levels of review prior to publication to ensure the quality and value of our audit reports. The methodology is backed up by comprehensive work paper procedures specifically developed to complement the methodology.

The Four Step Methodology consists of:

1. Identify the Problem Areas-including identifying the purpose of the organization as described by law and/or policy; identify the standards to judge performance by; and identify the program purposes being met.
2. Measure the Effect of the Identified Problems-including if the program purpose is being met efficiently, effectively, and economically; and how have identified problems impacted the organization.
3. Pinpoint the Source of the Identified Problem-How did the problems begin; are the sources of the problem internal or external.
4. Provide Recommendations that can be Implemented in the CCSF Environment-How can the program be bettered; how can improvements be implemented, how can improvements work in the environment in which the organization must operate.

The tools used in this methodology are universally accepted by government auditors. They consist of interviews, literature research, policy and procedure analysis, document reviews, survey research, flow and communication analysis, observation analysis, and statistical analysis. Each one of these methodological tools was used in the present audit.

CHAPTER III

911 EMERGENCY SYSTEM AND POLICE DISPATCH DESCRIPTION AND CURRENT OPERATIONS

A. History of System

Nine-One-One (911) is the number adopted by the telephone industry as a nationwide standard for reporting emergency situations. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company announced in January of 1968 that 911 would be made available throughout the country in response to the urgings of concerned citizens and officials for a standard, dedicated emergency telephone number. The purpose of the 911 emergency services system is to provide a single, primary three-digit emergency number through which emergency services can be quickly and efficiently obtained.

Title 5, Division 2, Part 1, Chapter 1, Article 6, Sections 53100 through 53120 of the California Government Code, Revenue and Tax Code Part 20 Division 2, Chapters 1 to 7 and California Administrative Code 18 Section 2401 established "911" as the primary emergency telephone number for use in the State for persons seeking emergency services. The statute requires that every "911" system shall include police, firefighting, and emergency medical and ambulance services, and that other emergency services, such as poison control, suicide prevention, and civil defense, may be made available at the discretion of the public agency. The Communications Division of the California State Department of General Services is tasked with reviewing and updating technical and operational standards for public agency systems.

San Francisco's 911 system became operational in 1981. Prior to the 911 system becoming operational, persons seeking emergency assistance were required to contact a telephone company operator, who would connect the call to a Hall of Justice operator, who would then transfer the call to a communications dispatcher. The 911 system bypasses telephone company operators and switchboard operators by connecting directly to a call evaluator in the Police Department's Communications Center in the Hall of Justice.

The San Francisco Police Department's Communications Center is designated as the Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) for 911 calls in the City and County of San Francisco. PSAP operators ("call evaluators") receiving 911 emergency calls transfer such calls to police dispatchers, or to call evaluators at the Health Department or the Fire Department for disposition.

The original 911 system included Automatic Number Identification (ANI), which displays the telephone number of the calling party. The system was upgraded in 1984 to include Automatic Location Identification (ALI), which displays the street address of the calling party. The system also includes a call detail recording

function that causes call details, such as calling telephone number, attendant position number, ringing started time, call answered time, etc., to be printed. The 911 system was upgraded to an AT&T System 85 in July of 1990. The current system features enhanced reporting functions and distributes calls more efficiently than its predecessor.

B. Current Operations

1. 911 Emergency System Component Process Description.

The 911 Emergency System is actually one part of a three component process that delivers emergency assistance to the general public. The three component process can be described as the 911 Emergency Phone System, the Police-Fire-Emergency Medical Dispatch System and the Service Delivery System or actual arrival of a police car, a fire engine and/or a paramedic unit to the emergency.

The first component of the process is the 911 Emergency Phone System. The 911 System is part of the California State Mandated System that designates one answering point for all emergency calls within a city and/or a county as previously described. The elements of the CCSF system include the actual phone trunk lines, the telecommunications answering hardware and software (provided by AT&T and Motorola) and the human staff answerers called 911 "call evaluators". The ACDS system (Automatic Call Distribution System) automatically routes incoming emergency 911 and nonemergency 553-0123 calls to the 911 call evaluators who answer the calls. These 911 call evaluators (who also work half a shift as police dispatchers), answer the call and then direct the call to the appropriate dispatch center or referral service to handle. The 911 call evaluators specific responsibilities include:

- Answering the 911 Phone Lines and the nonemergency lines;

- Using a translation service as necessary;

- Determining if the call is an emergency or not and redirecting the call if needed;

- Determining which emergency service is needed (Fire, Police or Paramedic);

- Transferring the call to Fire or Department of Public Health Dispatchers as appropriate;

- Determining if it is a police call, gathering the required information and entering the information into the Police Dispatch System (CAD), assigning a priority A-B-C to the call (see Exhibit I) and then transferring the call to a police dispatcher.

EXHIBIT I

POLICE DISPATCH CALL PRIORITY CODE DEFINITIONS

Each dispatch system (Police, Fire and Health Services) within the City and County of San Francisco has developed a three level priority system for citizen calls. The San Francisco Police Department* uses an A-B-C Priority System in classifying citizen calls. This system was developed by the Communications Unit in consultation with the Patrol Bureau and approved by the Chief of Police as of 7/6/90.

Once the 911 "Call Evaluator" determines that the call needs a police response, he/she assigns a priority to the call (A-B-C). This priority is entered into the Police Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system and transferred on to the Police Dispatcher. The Dispatcher determines the geographical limits within which the Patrol Bureau requires the field units to respond to the call. An A Priority mandates a City-Wide response, a B Priority mandates a District-Wide response and a C Priority mandates a Sector Wide Response only. If none of the units specified are available within the geographical limitations of the priority system, the call is broadcast and allowed to wait (cue) for the next available specified unit within the geographical area (City, District or Sector).

Only when the conditions of a call change, can a higher priority be assigned to a specific call. The standards for the priority of the calls is as follows:

A- Priority (City-Wide Response)

1. There is present or imminent danger to life or major property,
2. The suspect of a crime involving loss of life or serious bodily harm is in the area and might reasonably be apprehended,
3. A major crime scene must be protected,
4. A juvenile is missing or involved in sexual abuse or assault,
5. An elderly person, or other "at risk" person is missing.

B-Priority (District-Wide Response)

1. There is the potential for physical harm, or damage to property,
2. The suspect may be in the area.

C-Priority (Sector-Wide Response)

1. There is no present or potential danger to life or property,
2. The suspect is no longer in the area,
3. The crime scene is protected (victim cooperative)

*NOTE: Since the focus of the study is the 911 System and certain aspects of Police Dispatch. The report will not focus on Fire or Department of Health dispatch systems.

Once the call is answered, evaluated, and input into the 911 System, it is transferred to the appropriate agency's dispatch center (police, fire, health services, University police, Coast Guard, etc.) by the 911 call evaluator. After this component ends, the second component of the process is initiated, namely Dispatch. Police Dispatch is basically the process of assigning calls to available units, gathering information as needed by patrol units or officers and/or monitoring waiting calls until patrol units are available for assignment. The Dispatcher's specific responsibilities include:

- Receiving calls from the 911 call evaluators, and entering any additional information as necessary into the Police CAD System;

- Gathering suspect, vehicle, or prior incident information from a number of law enforcement data bases as appropriate or as requested;

- Identifying available units for assignment of the call and then broadcasting the call to the unit; or,

- "Cueing" the call (placing unassigned calls on hold) and monitoring them until a patrol unit is available to broadcast the call;

- Dispatching other units or obtaining additional information at the request of the patrol units or field supervisors as appropriate.

Once the call is broadcast, and the patrol vehicle accepts the assignment, the primary dispatch function is complete (except for gathering additional information as needed for patrol units or field supervisors) and the third component of the 911 Emergency process is initiated, Service Delivery (the arrival of the patrol unit to the scene).

The actual acceptance of a broadcast assignment by a unit and the actual arrival of a unit to a scene is the responsibility of the field sergeants in that sector and/or division. Field sergeants (not the Communications Division) are responsible for making sure units answer, accept and respond to calls as sent by the dispatchers (Communications Center). Sergeants, (as well as District Commanders) have the authority to delay or reroute broadcasted calls or dispatching vehicles, and ultimately assigning specific units to calls for response.

Since 1989, when the concept of sector and division integrity for patrol assignments was implemented, (see Appendix A) only District Commanders have the authority to allow units to break sector or division boundaries and have one unit from one sector or division respond to a B or C priority call in another sector or division.

Because this is a Patrol Workforce issue (Patrol Bureau responsibility) and not a 911 System or Dispatch controlled responsibility, this component of the process did not fall within the scope of the current study and was not researched. However it is an important aspect of the process which is mentioned as a possible future study item in Chapter VI Section B of this report.

A detailed flowchart of the 911 Process follows as Exhibit II. In addition, a summary explanation of the process and the factors that are involved in the decisions made at each step of the process is illustrated in Exhibit III.

2. 911 Emergency System and Police Dispatch Standards and Operations

The State of California mandates that a 911 Emergency System be implemented by a public safety agency for emergency access by citizens (as previously discussed). Specifically, the Warren 911 Emergency Assistance Act states:

"The Legislature hereby finds and declares that it is in the public interest to shorten the time required for a citizen to request and receive emergency aid...provision of a single, primary three-digit emergency number through which emergency services can be quickly and efficiently obtained would provide a significant contribution to law enforcement and other public service efforts...the Legislature further finds and declares that the establishment of a uniform, statewide emergency number is a matter of statewide concern and interest to all inhabitants and citizens of this state...and encourages [amended later to mandate] units of local government and combinations of such units to develop and improve emergency communication procedures and facilities in such a manner as to be able to quickly respond to any person calling the telephone number 911 seeking police, fire, medical, rescue, and other emergency services."

As of July 1988 every County in the State has a basic 911 emergency system, with 20 of the State's 58 counties having enhanced versions of the system. In addition, the law specifies that all costs of the 911 Trunk Lines, 911 telecommunications software and hardware are to be paid for by the State of California.

Among the above mentioned laws are mandatory and nonmandatory system standards to ensure a minimum level of service. These Standards are stipulated in the Fifth Edition of the State of California 911 Operations Manual.

The mandatory standards include:

The primary published emergency telephone number shall be 911 and will be the only number on the "Emergency" page of the telephone directory.

EXHIBIT II

Communications Center Call Evaluation and Dispatching Processes




Exhibit III

9-1-1 Emergency System Responses: A Framework for Analysis

<u>Required Action</u>	<u>Action Responsibility</u>	<u>Action Determinants</u>	<u>Existing Criteria</u>	<u>Existing Controls</u>
Connect to 9-1-1-Evaluator	Communications Center Management.	Number of phone positions; Number of 9-1-1 operators; Number of 9-1-1 calls; Number of 553-0123 non-emergency calls; Length of each communication.	10 Seconds Maximum to Connect.	Computer reports showing performance averages by each half-hour.
If necessary, obtain translation services	Call Evaluator	Availability of in-house services; Availability of State contract services; Translator proficiency.	Immediately Available	None
9-1-1 Operator Evaluates the Problem	Call Evaluator	Training Experience Conscientiousness Judgment	Numerous criteria contained in written procedures.	Occasional Senior Dispatcher monitoring and CAD entry review; Caller complaints.
If appropriate, transfer to Fire Dispatcher or Emergency Medical Services Dispatcher	Call Evaluator	Nature of the Problem	Written procedures.	None required.

Exhibit III

9-1-1 Emergency System Responses: A Framework for Analysis

<u>Required Action</u>	<u>Action Responsibility</u>	<u>Action Determinants</u>	<u>Existing Criteria</u>	<u>Existing Controls</u>
Enter information into CAD System, assign priority, and transfer to Police Dispatcher	Call Evaluator	Typing proficiency English proficiency Efficiency of assignment guidelines	Numerous criteria contained in written procedures.	Occasional CAD entry review by a Senior Communication Dispatcher.
Receive call information and dispatch police unit per priority procedure	Police Dispatcher	Training Experience Conscientiousness Judgment	Numerous criteria contained in written procedures.	Occasional CAD and channel monitoring by a Senior Communication Dispatcher
Priority "A"	Police Dispatcher	Priority Guidelines		
Priority "B"	Police Dispatcher	Priority Guidelines		
Priority "C"	Police Dispatcher	Priority Guidelines		

The telephone companies shall take periodic service measurements on the 911 trunk groups to ensure a minimum P Level of Service of P.01. These measurements shall also be taken at the request of local public safety agencies. Participating public safety agencies and the State of California Telecommunications Division will be notified of the results of P Level Service measurements.

All 911 lines will have visual and audible signaling of incoming calls. Tone signals (audible ringing, busy tone, and all-trunks-busy) shall be provided in the normal manner as in seven-digit lines.

Each Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) shall be responsible for answering 911 calls at all times.

When answering a 911 call at a primary PSAP, the call will be answered so as not to identify the PSAP as a police department, fire department, etc. but rather "911 Emergency, what are you reporting" or "City 'A' 911 may I help you," etc.

The numerals "911" shall not be used in any way as to cause confusion or be misleading to the public.

The advertising of seven-digit telephone numbers for any type of emergency service by either public or private agencies is not permitted.

Private ambulance companies cannot use the numerals "911" in the name of their company nor may they list 911 in the telephone directory without written authorization from the PSAP(s) that will be affected by the listing. When 911 is authorized, the ambulance companies must also list a seven-digit telephone number for nonemergency calls.

When employing the transfer method, procedures will be developed for advising the calling party that the call is being transferred and to remain on the line. Each 911 call may be transferred only once. Should a 911 call be inadvertently transferred to the wrong subsequent agency, that agency will perform the interrogation and relay the information to the proper agency.

All PSAP's will maintain interagency communications capabilities for the purpose of emergency coordination.

All facilities and equipment associated with 911 service shall be provided protective devices to prevent accidental workman contact. Each protected facility or equipment will be clearly identified.

Protected 911 circuits will not be opened, grounded, short-circuited, or manipulated in any way unless the appropriate PSAP has released the circuit.

Telephone company supervisors will assure that all company employees whose normal duties may include contact with 911 facilities are familiar with procedures designed to safeguard those facilities.

The nonmandatory but strongly suggested standards include:

During the busiest hour of any shift, ten seconds should be targeted as the maximum amount of time incoming 911 calls are to be answered.

Documented training and adequate written procedures should be provided to PSAP operators.

All PSAP transactions be tape recorded, including an accurate means of determining date and time of call receipt.

To prevent disruption of operations, each PSAP or associated dispatch center should secure and exercise access control.

To have some default answering system to provide additional assurance of emergency 911 call completion. (This applies only to selective routing systems.)

Where available, a recorded message should be provided to incoming calls in the event all answering positions are busy. The message should state that the 911 Emergency number has been reached and that the call will be answered as soon as possible. Another option is for a recording that acknowledges action taken for a major incident, further advising the caller to remain on the line if the call is unrelated to that incident.

A short-term recording and reply capability should be provided for each answering position to assist in dispatch accuracy.

Backup interagency communications capability should be available in every PSAP.

When a PSAP facility is being designed, consideration should be given to human engineering. Factors such as lighting, acoustics, air conditioning, and other environmental influences can increase or inhibit operator effectiveness.

Emergency electrical generators should be considered essential at the PSAP to ensure continued 911 and other communications operations in the event of commercial power failure. In addition, battery backup should be provided to ensure uninterrupted system operation while system is transferring from commercial power to backup generator power.

Alternate entry routes for commercial power and telephone company cables should be considered at every PSAP facility.

Beyond these specific mandatory and nonmandatory standards, there are no other State or Federal Standards that local 911 Systems or dispatch centers are legally obligated to follow. A review of the

San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) General Orders, Technical Services Division General Orders and all other police training materials indicates that there are no additional standards beyond the standards already mentioned by State Regulations. It is orally communicated that all calls and dispatches will be handled as quickly and efficiently as possible. SFPD is meeting all of the mandatory standards and most of the nonmandatory standards. The nonmandatory standards not being met are discussed in Chapter V Findings and Recommendations.

3. Organization and Line of Command

As previously discussed in Section B Subsection 1 of this audit report, the CCSF emergency services regularly accessed through the 911 emergency system are the Police Department, the Fire Department, and the Emergency Medical Services (Paramedics) of the Department of Public Health. The public accesses those emergency services through the 911 emergency services telephone lines and answered by 911 operators (call evaluators) as previously discussed.

The 911 Emergency System and Police Dispatch System are assigned to the Communications Section of the Technical Services Division of the San Francisco Police Department and is organized as shown in Exhibit IV on the following page. The Officer-in-Charge of the Communications Section is a Police Lieutenant. The Commanding Officer of the Technical Services Division is a Police Captain who reports to the Deputy Chief of Police for Administration as shown in the June 1989 Police Department organizational chart (Exhibit V). However, as of the writing of this report, the Police Department has recently reorganized and has not produced a revised organization chart.

The Communications Section is authorized a total of 133 positions in the FY 1990-91 Budget. Six of those 133 positions are sworn police officer positions, three of which are Q60 Police Lieutenant positions and three Q2 Police Officer positions. The remaining 127 positions are civilian positions, 116 of which are 8238 Communication Dispatchers and 11 are 8239 Senior Communication Dispatcher positions.


C. Current Operating Statistics

1. Budget


Exhibit VI shows budget information for the Communications Section at the character level (major expenditure category) for the current fiscal year and the six previous fiscal years. The annual data show that Character 06, Labor Costs, accounts for approximately 93 percent to 95 percent of the Section's total budget. The other category of size, Character 30, Services-Other Depts., is primarily for the services provided the Communications Section by the Department of Telecommunications.

Exhibit IV

Communications Section Organizational Chart



SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION






Exhibit VI

Communications Section Budget Data

Expenditure Category	FY84-85	FY85-86	FY86-87	FY87-88	FY88-89	FY89-90	FY90-91
06 Labor Costs	\$4,459,965	\$5,588,161	\$6,416,046	\$7,229,528	\$6,846,177	\$6,448,529	\$6,852,106
10 Contractual Costs	655,956	736,555	63,774	11,626	9,926	7,236	175
12 Mat & Supplies	4,007	15,916	3,197	12,282	5,697	9,571	44,668
24 Equipment	410,774	466,130	0	581	37,726	222,290	0
30 Services-Other Depts	1,119,613	1,839,094	103,586	337,252	168,119	223,011	295,916
Other(Programmatic, Work Order, Recoveries, Etc.)	37,407	32,234	114,077	54,732	236,166	0	0
Totals	\$6,650,315	\$8,678,090	\$6,700,680	\$7,646,001	\$7,303,811	\$6,910,637	\$7,192,865
Overtime	\$180,986	\$189,547	\$245,887	\$244,954	\$152,620	\$234,160	\$123,647
Mandatory Fringe Benefits (Both included in Labor Costs above)	\$1,353,212	\$1,809,636	\$2,107,712	\$2,350,086	\$1,943,671	\$1,468,617	\$1,587,903

Budget items such as Travel and Training are controlled at the Police Department level, and thus are not shown.

The large expenditures for Contractual Costs, Equipment and Service-Other Departments in FY 1984-85 and FY 1985-86 were for department wide costs for telephone services, PIC radios and computer maintenance charges.

2. Personnel/Staffing

Exhibit VII shows classifications and numbers of personnel authorizations for the Communications Section for the current year and for the previous six years. This Exhibit also shows numbers of personnel actually assigned to the Communications Section for the current year and for the previous four years.

These exhibits show that personnel authorizations have increased substantially from FY 1984-85, but that those authorizations decreased significantly from fiscal years 1988-89 and 1989-90 to FY 1990-91. The reason for that decrease was the transfer of 30 uniformed personnel out of the section and into other bureaus between FY 1989-90 and FY 1990-91.

Specific staffing issues are addressed in Chapter V - Findings and Recommendations.

3. Significant 911 System and Police Dispatch Statistics

While the study found that there were no formal performance standards used by the Police Department or the City to judge performance against, there are a number of operational (system) statistics that can give a perception of how the 911 Emergency System and Police Dispatch System are operating. The statistics are presented below:

Number of Calls Received on 911 Emergency Lines and on 553-0123 Nonemergency Lines for Calendar Year 1990 were:

911:	575,240
553-0123:	583,635

Average Time Calls Waited on Hold for 911 and 553-0123 Lines from August 1, 1990 to December 31, 1990 were:

911:	2.0 seconds
553-0123:	52.1 seconds

Total Number of A-B-C Priority Calls Dispatched in Calendar Year 1990 were:

A:	57,922 (13.5%)
B:	134,181 (31.3%)
C:	237,187 (55.2%)
Total:	429,290 (100.0%)

Exhibit VII - Authorized and Assigned Positions

Title	Class	Current Salary (Top Step)	PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED						FY90-91
			FY84-85	FY85-86	FY86-87	FY87-88	FY88-89	FY89-90	
001 Perm Salaries-Misc					Number Authorized				
Clerk Typist	1424	\$26,702	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Secretary I	1444	\$27,898	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Secretary II	1446	\$32,318	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Police Services Aide	8213	\$36,244	3	3	2	2	2	2	1
Police Comm. Dispatch	8238	\$36,946	80	101	101	101	116	116	116
Sr. Police Comm. Disp.	8239	\$42,692	2	2	2	2	9	9	9
Sub-total			86	107	106	106	128	128	127
002 Perm Sal.-Uniformed									
Policeman	Q2	\$41,964	13	13	16	21	21	21	3
Assistant Inspector	Q35	\$48,646	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Police Sergeant	Q50	\$48,646	6	6	3	11	11	11	0
Police Lieutenant	Q60	\$55,614	3	3	2	3	3	3	3
Police Captain	Q80	\$65,286	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Sub-total			24	24	23	36	36	36	6
Personnel Authorized			110	131	129	142	164	164	133
Title	Class	Current Salary (Top Step)	PERSONNEL ASSIGNED						FY90-91
			FY84-85	FY85-86	FY86-87	FY87-88	FY88-89	FY89-90	
001 Perm Salaries-Misc					Number Assigned				
Clerk Typist	1424	\$26,702			1	1	0	1	0
Secretary I	1444	\$27,898			0	0	1	0	0
Secretary II	1446	\$32,318			0	0	0	0	1
Police Services Aide	8213	\$36,244			0	0	0	0	0
Police Comm. Dispatch	8238	\$36,946			86	87	111	117	110
Sr. Police Comm. Disp.	8239	\$42,692			2	2	2	9	9
Sub-total					89	90	114	127	120
Policeman	Q2	\$41,964			30	23	18	5	2
Assistant Inspector	Q35	\$48,646			0	0	0	0	0
Police Sergeant	Q50	\$48,646			8	8	7	2	2
Police Lieutenant	Q60	\$55,614			2	2	3	1	1
Police Captain	Q80	\$65,286			0	0	1	0	0
Sub-total					40	33	29	8	5
Total Personnel Assigned					129	123	143	135	125

Average Time it took to Dispatch calls once entered into the Police CAD System (including cue or holding times) and the Average Time for Police Units to Arrive at a Scene, by Priority for Calendar Year 1990 were:

	Dispatch Time	Travel Time	Total Response Time
A:	2:03 minutes	4:37 minutes	6:40 minutes
B:	8:04 minutes	6:49 minutes	14:53 minutes
C:	40:41 minutes	10:12 minutes	50:53 minutes

Average Time on the Call Scene by the Patrol Unit by Priority for the Calendar Year of 1990 were:

A:	55:55 minutes
B:	39:02 minutes
C:	24:48 minutes

The following are other priority statuses that police units can be assigned when on duty.

On View¹: 53:29 minutes

Self²: 37:22 minutes

¹NOTE: "On View" is the average time police are checking on a situation that they have viewed personally (and thus not Dispatch Initiated) and are not available for immediate calls.

²NOTE: "Self" are the average times that units take themselves off the air to run administrative tasks (i.e., report writing, station checks, etc.)

Again, because there are no formal performance standards developed by the Police Department or the City to compare these statistics to, it is difficult to judge whether Communications is doing an excellent, fair or poor performance. In the past, community reaction and internal police department subjective evaluation have been the criteria used to measure performance. This problem is addressed in more detail in Chapter IV Findings and Recommendations.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

What follows are the Findings and Recommendations developed by the audit team for this report. These Findings and Recommendations are divided into seven sections. They are Management Issues, Personnel Issues, Operations Issues, Budgeting/Staffing Issues, Patrol Bureau Issues, 1987 Audit Follow-Up Issues and Other Issues.

A. Management Issues

Finding: The Technical Services Division and the Communications Section have not formulated nor documented any Mission Statements, Goals, or Objectives.

Condition: It is important for any organization to have well defined goals and objectives that communicate their purpose for existing, their "organizational philosophy" and how they fit into the larger organization (i.e., the Police Department) as a whole. These goals and objectives should flow from the mission of the organization and should be communicated to not only employees within the organization but others outside of the organization as well.

1. RECOMMENDATION: The Technical Services Division as a whole and the Communications Section specifically develop a mission statement, and well defined goals and objectives for employees to understand and internalize. These goals and objectives should be distributed to all interested organizations and individuals.

Finding: There are few if any performance standards for the Communications Sections's effectiveness to be measured against. Consequently, there are few if any objective performance standards to measure employee efficiency and effectiveness as well.

Condition: Besides the general State of California Operational Standards that are mandated by the State, there are no performance measures, standards or goals for the Communications Section to measure its performance by. Thus, there are no objective measures to evaluate the Section's performance. A consequence of this is that employees have no standards or performance objectives to gauge their individual performance against. This vacuum of standards leads to subjective evaluations of both the units effectiveness and the employees. If the Section has no target performance standards, it is difficult for management to evaluate performance and thus improve efficiency or effectiveness. Consequently, if employees have no standards or measures to base their performance on, they (and management) will have problems improving efficiency and effectiveness.

2. RECOMMENDATION: Technical Services Division Management needs to develop objective performance measures and standards for the communications section. These standards should be based on Police Department and Divisional goals and objectives and on CCSF mandated performance criteria.
3. RECOMMENDATION: Once the Unit's performance criteria is established, both Division Management and Employees should develop objective employee standards and measures to use in improving the performance of Communications Center Employees.
4. RECOMMENDATION: Once these two sets of measures are developed, they should be tracked on a regular basis and shared with employees to help improve the efficiency of the Communications Center as a whole, and individual employees.

Finding: There is no organizational consistency or stability in the Communications Section's Management.

Condition: Due to the practice of rotating Captains and Lieutenants once a year or sometimes more often, within the Police Department, the Communications Center has suffered from a lack of cohesive and stable management. The effect of this practice has manifested itself in four ways:

Policies and Procedures change every time a new Captain or Lieutenant comes in, causing lack of consensus in upper management, operational disruption and stress problems for employees.

Past management has not exhibited the technical knowledge nor the long term commitment needed to make major long term decisions for Communications. Many important decisions have been made without thorough research or technical/operational expertise and thus poorly formulated past decisions continue to cause severe problems for Communications (in terms of facilities, equipment purchases, employee morale).

There is no long term or forceful spokesperson for the center who can organizationally "fight" for communications needs or input on decisions. Those interviewed have stated that because of the para-military nature of the Police Department, line of command traditions (as well as promotion opportunities) usually prohibit lower ranked officers to really speak out on issues. Also the rotation policy places officers into the communications management position who do not understand the historical and technical problems the center has to deal with on a multi-year basis.

Dispatchers and especially Senior Dispatchers have no stable management role models or long range supervision to take direction from, since their supervisor changes almost every year. This leads to poor moral, a feeling by dispatchers of no upper management support and lack of a cohesive and long term direction.

5. RECOMMENDATION: The Department transfer the sworn personnel in the section to other bureaus and fund and hire a civilian Manager of Communications that has the equivalent rank of Captain and reports to a Deputy Chief. This would solve the problem of command rotation, the the section a manager who is trained in the technical aspects of communications as well as in "managing civilians" and who can be an aggressive advocate for the section without worrying about rank promotions. This recommendation would add an additional cost to the Department of approximately \$81,607 (top step of pay plus applicable civilian fringe benefits).

Finding: There is no documented long term strategic plan for the Communications Center outlining future direction, future equipment needs, facilities improvements or problem resolution strategies.

Condition: Because of the technical and strategic importance of Communications, a short term and long term strategic plan is mandatory to keep up with future equipment enhancements, operational improvements and better service delivery. Senior Department management must be actively involved in the future direction of Communications and therefore must understand where Communications has been in the past, and where it needs to go in the future.

6. RECOMMENDATION: Communications Management and Senior Department Management should develop and implement a short and a long range strategic plan for the Communications Center. These plans should address technical, management, employee, operational and facility issues. The plan should have reasonable milestones for achievement and should be reviewed and updated on a regular basis.

Finding: There is low self esteem and low morale among dispatchers and some senior dispatchers in Communications.

Condition: Interviews have indicated that this problem comes from a number of historical and current problems. Historically, (as stated by many of those interviewed) most of the dispatchers and their supervisors were made up of light duty sworn officers, many of whom were either discipline problems or determined to be unacceptable for field work. Thus, the reputation of Communications with SFPD management and field officers was not very high.

In addition, upper police department management was not very supportive of Communications and thus a limited amount of resources and attention was paid to the unit. Currently, with the civilization of dispatchers and their supervisors, not only is there a historical bias against the unit, but it has been reported through interviews with dispatchers that current sworn officers and supervisors many times exhibit a negative bias toward the civilian workers. This is sometimes manifested by:

Rude behavior from field units to the dispatchers;

Sometimes uncooperative behavior from field units and sergeants to dispatch problems or requests;

Major decisions being made in the patrol bureau or at the command level without input from communications;

Neglect in the support of facility maintenance or improvement by the Department;

Reported lack of support/respect by field supervisors, non administrative bureau management or police senior management for dispatch personnel when dealing with other sworn officers

These elements (among others) have caused morale to drop among dispatchers and have caused dispatchers operational, emotional and performance problems.

7. RECOMMENDATION: Have the Chief of Police and Deputy Chiefs reaffirm the importance of the Communications Center with personnel in their respective Bureaus.
8. RECOMMENDATION: Develop a General Order that states that rudeness, disrespect and/or deliberate subvention of dispatchers or dispatch operations shall not be tolerated and shall be disciplined.
9. RECOMMENDATION: Develop a General Order that states that no decision or operational change be made in other bureaus, that effects the Communications Center operations, without first consulting Communications regarding the ramifications to its operations.
10. RECOMMENDATION: Develop a procedure that mandates NC's (notations in the log given by dispatchers when they cannot contact a patrol unit) and NCCs (notations entered the log by dispatchers when units will not respond) be followed up and the results communicated back to Communications. This recommendation includes monitoring of these problems by the Deputy Chiefs on a regular basis.

11. RECOMMENDATION: Develop a training session that deals with communications dispatch and how important it is in the law enforcement effort. This session should be incorporated into Cadet Training and incorporated into advanced training for current officers.

Finding: Senior Dispatchers have supervision and management problems when dealing with Dispatchers.

Condition: The Senior Dispatcher's sometimes have problems with supervising and managing Dispatchers. This problem stems from a number of sources including:

Lack of supervisorial training for Senior Dispatchers;

Lack of standards regarding specific duties and responsibilities for senior dispatchers;

Lack of Division Management communication to Dispatchers that Senior Dispatchers are supervisors and that Dispatchers will report to and follow Senior Dispatch direction;

Individual Senior Dispatchers have personality conflicts with individual dispatchers that are unresolved by Division Management and which leads to performance problems;

The selection process for Senior Dispatchers was suspect by Dispatchers and thus certain individuals who became Senior Dispatchers are not respected by certain Dispatchers;

Senior Dispatchers have no "weight" with many sworn officers and thus they are not treated with respect. This negative attitude is observed and sometimes internalized by some of the dispatchers as well.

All these factors were reported to have left the Senior Dispatchers confused about their individual roles, and to feel that there is no support from Division Management to do their jobs.

12. RECOMMENDATION: That a detailed job description be developed for the Senior Dispatch position describing responsibilities, powers, authority, performance criteria, and duties with input from current Senior Dispatchers and Division Management.

13. RECOMMENDATION: The Lieutenant and Captain of the Division visit each Dispatcher Line-Up and reaffirm the roles of the Senior Dispatchers and their duties and responsibilities.

14. RECOMMENDATION: That each current Senior Dispatcher and each newly hired Senior Dispatcher receive at least forty hours of supervisory and management training.
15. RECOMMENDATION: That the Chief of Police send a memo out to all sworn personnel outlining the duties of the Senior Dispatchers and their responsibilities.
16. RECOMMENDATION: That the Officer in Charge of the Communications Section become more active in the personality conflicts that surround the problems between individual Dispatchers and individual Senior Dispatchers and facilitate these problems until they are resolved.
17. RECOMMENDATION: That Senior Dispatchers receive more direct supervision from Division Management as the backgrounds and performance of the Senior Dispatchers demand.
18. RECOMMENDATION: Division Management conduct monthly meetings with all Senior Dispatchers to go over new procedures, pass on information, discuss problems and gain input from Senior Dispatchers on upcoming policy or procedure changes.

Finding: The management structure authorized in the FY 1990-91 budget is inadequate to provide the degree of planning, direction, and control required for effective operation of the Communications Section.

Condition: There is no single individual responsible for dispatch operations during a single shift. Each shift has three Senior Dispatchers assigned, but they do not report to any mid-level manager during the shift. This is poor span of control and requires the senior dispatchers to work beyond their classified roles. In addition, the authorized supervisory position structure of the Communications Section changed from that of one police captain, three police lieutenants, 11 police sergeants, and nine senior communication dispatchers in FY 1989-90, as shown in Exhibit VII, to that of three police lieutenants and nine senior communication dispatchers in FY 1990-91. One police lieutenant, the Officer-in-Charge, is actually assigned to the Communications Section; the other two police lieutenant positions are vacant. Currently there is no mid-management level interfacing between the senior communication dispatchers and senior division management.

Given that the senior dispatchers have only held their positions for approximately 18 months, have little other managerial experience, and vary significantly in levels of performance, the span-of-control required of the Officer-in-Charge to effectively manage the myriad operations of the Communications Center is too wide; the Officer-in-Charge is spread too thinly to effectively control operations. This has caused some problems to exist.

To effectively manage the operations of the Communications Room, some position changes and organization changes need to be implemented.

19. RECOMMENDATION: Transfer the current uniformed positions in the FY 1990-91 budget to other needed areas and provide for a new Civil Service classification 8240, Communications Watch Supervisor, and authorize three such positions to manage the operations of the Communications Section. This can be done at an additional cost to the City of \$195,352 (this includes top salary step plus fringe benefits of three positions), as outlined in Section D of this report.

B. Personnel Issues

Finding: Use of sick pay leave and non-paid absences by Communication Dispatchers is excessive.

Condition: Of 100 Communication Dispatchers who were assigned to the Communications Section for all or most of calendar year 1990, paid and unpaid absences other than for vacation and holidays were approximately as follows:

<u>Type Absence</u>	<u>Hours Absent</u>
Sick Pay	11,612
Overtime Used	1,839
Other Paid Absences	1,096
Non-paid Absences	<u>7,235</u>
Total	21,782
Overtime earned (at 1.5 times regular time)	1,795

The statistics demonstrate that the average number of days taken for each of the communication dispatchers included in the analysis, for sick leave alone, is 16.6 days, computed for a seven hour work day. The average number of total days taken for absences is 31 days.

Given that communication dispatchers are available to work approximately 1631 hours per year (7 hours per day times 233 days, accounting for normal days off, 15 vacation days, and 13 holidays), absences due to sick pay and other paid and unpaid absences account for approximately 13.4 communication dispatcher positions.

In addition to the absences described above, an additional six Communications Section personnel were on long-term leave status due to illness, pregnancy, and other reasons.

The effect of this excessive sick pay and other absence use is to reduce the availability of communication dispatchers to handle the workloads. Absences require that management obtain other personnel to work overtime, which is compensated at one and one-half times regular time, or to reduce services, or some combination thereof.

Even though the annual performance appraisals reviewed contain statements admonishing individuals to curtail the excessive and abusive use of sick pay, there still is a problem.

20. RECOMMENDATION: That management continue to closely monitor the use of sick leave and other absences and to counsel employees regarding excessive use. This may include disciplinary measures when warranted.
21. RECOMMENDATION: That management take every action possible, including those recommended in this audit report, to enhance the organizational standing and morale of the Communications Section, in order to help alleviate the problems of excessive absences.
22. RECOMMENDATION: Do not grant non-paid leave time unless under extreme circumstances. Counsel employees who use excessive unpaid leave.

Finding: The number of disciplinary cases involving members of the Communications Section has increased significantly in the past eighteen months.

Condition: The number of cases cited in the finding includes disciplinary actions involving public complaints filed against members of the Communications Section as well as disciplinary actions involving tardiness and other transgressions. The reason for the increased number of disciplinary cases involving members of the Section is that the rules and regulations of the Police Department, including rules that cover how 911 Emergency calls are to be handled, have been more diligently enforced in the past 18 months than they were previously. One constant complaint by staff interviewed was that the disciplinary process, as currently administered is cumbersome, inefficient, and much too lengthy.

As shown in Exhibit VIII, the number of disciplinary actions filed against dispatchers has increased significantly beginning in FY 1989-90.

Exhibit VIII

Communications Section Disciplinary Cases

	FY 87-88	FY 88-89	FY 89-90	FY 90-91 (6 months)	Total
Total number of Police Department civilian disciplinary cases initiated	127	139	289	94	649
Number of Communications members involved in cases	16	17	97	(x)	190
Number of cases involving civilian members of Communications	15	15	71	55	156
Dispositions:					
Improper Conduct	7	7	32	28	74
Training	0	0	4	1	5
Counseling	2	1	7	0	10
Admonishment	2	3	9	6	20
Reprimand	2	1	6	5	14
Suspension	1	2	6	4	13
Resigned	0	0	0	0	0
Sick slip	0	0	0	4	4
Pending	0	0	0	8	8
Proper Conduct	5	6	25	14	50
Unfounded	3	0	8	1	12
Insufficient Evidence	0	1	1	0	2
Policy	0	0	1	2	3
No Further Action	0	1	1	5	7
Resigned	0	0	2	0	2
Cases still open	0	0	1	5	6
Total	15	15	71	55	156

Currently, and for the past eighteen months, complaints from the public regarding 911 calls for assistance are processed thoroughly and formally. It was found that prior to the last eighteen months, public complaints were often handled by uniformed supervisors in a very informal manner.

Exhibit IX is a diagram of the Police Department civilian disciplinary process. Depending on the nature of the incident, the process is designed to proceed progressively in instances of repeated offences. An investigation is necessary at each stage.

The Communication Section's experience involving the formal disciplinary process is as follows:

1. A recommendation is made to the Chief of Police on completion of an investigation. The typical waiting period for a decision is 21 days, but it frequently is much longer.
2. A decision on the recommendation to administer counseling, an admonishment, or a reprimand terminates the process.
3. A decision to hold a "Chief's Hearing" results in an additional delay of at least another 21 days, during which the matter is considered.
4. A decision to hold a Police Commission Hearing normally results in a waiting period of several months.

A typical example shows where an employee violates the rules over and over again, and discipline is recommended every time, and acted upon expeditiously, many times it takes 363 days (or one year) to have termination set. In most cases, those interviewed stated, there are many days between violations, and that the same rule is not violated twice, so progressive discipline has to start several times. Also, in most cases the procedural delays in the hearing are longer than those described above.

If the violation of the rules is extraordinarily heinous and represents a hazard to the public or detriment to the Section, then one or more steps in progressive discipline may be skipped over and the Section can proceed directly to a Chief's Hearing. But this is very rare.

Most theories on discipline state that for discipline to be effective, it should contain the elements of forewarning, immediacy, consistency, and impartiality. Conformance to these elements is especially important when the work involved concerns public safety.

Exhibit IX
Police Department
Civilian Disciplinary Process

<u>Disciplinary Step</u>	<u>Responsible Position</u>	<u>Possible Actions</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Counselling	Supervisor	Verbal Counselling	Record of counselling placed in personnel file.
Admonishment	Commanding Officer with the approval of the Chief of Police	Verbal Admonishment	Entry made in disciplinary record in Management Control Division
Reprimand	Chief of Police	Written reprimand. Placed in personnel file.	Record placed in personnel file and in Management Control Division file.
Chief's Hearing	Chief of Police	Counselling Admonishment Reprimand Suspension (30 day maximum)	
Police Commission Hearing	Police Commission	Any action listed above plus suspension for up to 180 days.	
Civil Service Hearing	Civil Service Commission	Any action listed above plus termination	

Every person interviewed regarding the disciplinary process has said the current system is bad and lacks most of the elements for effective discipline.

23. RECOMMENDATION: That the disciplinary process for Communication Dispatchers and Senior Communication Dispatchers be revised immediately to assure that cases are resolved in a minimum amount of time, while still continueing to follow CCSF Civil Service procedures.

Finding: Minimum Qualifications for the position of Communication Dispatcher (8238) are not high enough to generate highly-qualified applicants on the eligibility list.

Condition: Currently, minimum qualifications for the position of Communication Dispatcher, Class 8238, are as follows:

1. Two years of experience in a highly stressful public contact position providing information in person or by telephone. Example would be: Clerical positions with heavy public contact answering complaints; sales; telephone operation, customer service, or dispatching work.
2. Normal hearing ability.
3. Willingness to work weekends, nights, holidays and overtime.
4. Ability to work under stressful conditions.
5. Ability to type and operate computer data terminal at 35 words per minute.

In all of the other jurisdictions that we surveyed regarding this audit (see Appendix B) the minimum qualifications for an applicant included a high school diploma or its equivalent. A high school diploma or its equivalent is an indicator of a minimum degree of discipline and learning ability, which are two prerequisites for successfully completing the Communication Dispatcher Course.

During the interviews, many of the Communication Dispatchers and Senior Communication Dispatchers recommended that the minimum requirement to type and operate a computer terminal be raised because of the enhanced efficiency afforded a call evaluator/dispatcher who accurately types with a higher speed. Observations of both call evaluator and dispatcher stations in the Communication Center corroborates the advantages of being able to type fast and accurately. All the rest of the minimum requirements seemed to be acceptable.

24. RECOMMENDATION: That a high school diploma or its general educational equivalency be a minimum requirement for eligibility as a Communication Dispatcher.
25. RECOMMENDATION: That the existing capability to type and operate a computer data terminal at 35 words per minute be increased to 50 words per minute.

Finding: The Communications Section does not have a Continuing Education/Training Program.

Condition: The Communications Section does not have a Continuing Training Supervisor for the civilian staff. Continuing education/training is very important. Not only does it keep dispatchers informed of policy and procedure changes, equipment enhancements, and operational changes, but also it can be used to continually instill the need for patience and understanding in dealing with the public in call evaluators/dispatchers.

While the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Communications Section is very much aware of the need for continuing training, he has stated that due to the shortage of dispatchers to fulfill operational requirements (including the need to use communication dispatchers as on-the-job trainers for dispatcher candidates) there is no time remaining in which to conduct continuing training.

26. RECOMMENDATION: Assign the Training Coordinator who is responsible for coordinating the initial Communication Dispatcher Course with the additional responsibility as coordinator for continuing training. The Training Coordinator should be held responsible for developing a meaningful continuing training program, with the assistance of the Senior Communication Dispatchers. The Senior Communication Dispatchers should be held responsible to insure that their subordinates receive the required continuing training.
27. RECOMMENDATION: Develop an alternative to reduce the amount of dispatcher time to train new recruits so as to free them for their own educational needs.

Finding: The formal initial training provided candidates for the position of Communication Dispatcher is outstanding.

Condition: The training program administered to candidates for the position of Communications Dispatcher is outstanding in its comprehensiveness, documentation, use of training aids, and hands-on application. The City's instruction for Communication Dispatchers meets Peace Officer Standards Training (P.O.S.T.) criteria. The last three training classes, beginning in mid-1989, have been held at

the City's Police Academy for the classroom portion of the instruction. The on-the-job (OTJ) portion is conducted in the Communications Center. The classroom portion consists of 240 hours of instruction and covers such topics as Legal Aspects, Radio Procedures, and Telecommunications. Each of the three training sessions held at the Police Academy have been evaluated by candidates completing the course in excess of 5.1, on a scale of 6.0. Those evaluations compare favorably with the evaluations received by P.O.S.T. training centers as a whole.

NO RECOMMENDATION. NOTE: In the interviews pertaining to training it was stated that trainers should guard against "spoon feeding" the dispatcher candidates. In essence, it was felt that learning occurs most effectively in an environment in which the candidate or student feels or believes that the responsibility for mastering the material lies with the candidate and that training should not "protect" the candidate from the sometimes stressful experiences of real life.

Finding: The Police Department does not maintain training records for Communication Dispatchers or Senior Communication Dispatchers.

Condition: The Police Academy maintains a training record for the City's sworn officers, as shown in Exhibit X on the following page. The record is annotated to document annual training courses that are required for Peace Officer Standards and Training (P.O.S.T) and for other purposes.

The Police Academy does not maintain a training record for Communication Dispatchers or Senior Communication Dispatchers, nor does the Communications Section. As stated in the previous findings on continuing training, there is a critical need to give and keep track of training.

Police Academy personnel report that a training record for civilians is in the process of being developed.

28. RECOMMENDATION: That the Police Department implement the use of training records for Communication Dispatchers and Senior Communication Dispatchers and that such training records be kept current.

Finding: The "Duties and Responsibilities/Performance Criteria" section of Performance Appraisal Report for both the Communication Dispatcher classification and the Senior Communication Dispatcher classification are stated in general and vague terms. Neither section provides concrete and specific performance measures stated in qualitative or quantitative terms for measuring performance.

EXHIBIT X
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT
DEPARTMENTAL TRAINING INVENTORY
Individual Member's Record

Name _____ Star _____ Social Security # _____

P.O.S.T. Certificate: BASIC ☐ INTERMEDIATE ☐ ADVANCED ☐

S.F.P.D. Recruit School: CLASS NUMBER _____

From _____ to _____ No. of hours _____

ADVANCED OFFICER COURSES

CERTIFIED TECHNICAL COURSES

SUPERVISORY COURSE:

MIDDLE MANAGEMENT:

EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT:

OTHER COURSES & SEMINARS:

TEAR GAS CERTIFIED: _____

FIRST AID CERTIFICATION: _____

CPR CERTIFIED: _____

(Over)

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Condition: Section 1 of the Performance Appraisal Report, Duties and Responsibilities/Performance Criteria, specifies the criteria against which the factors in Sections II, III, IV, and V, respectively Performance Factors, Managerial Factors, Overall Evaluation and Comments, are rated. In general, the performance criteria should be as concrete and specific as the jobs tasks permit. Performance criteria that are concrete and specific provide a more objective basis for evaluation, especially when they can be quantified. Correspondingly, concrete and specific criteria provide goals and objectives for those being evaluated.

29. RECOMMENDATION: That the Duties and Responsibilities Section of the Performance Appraisal Report for classifications 8238 and 8239 be completely rewritten in concrete and specific terms that relate to the tasks that these classifications must perform.

C. Operations Issues

Finding: There is no quality assurance program within the Communications Section.

Condition: For operations to be improved and made more efficient and to help prevent problems from occurring, it is important that a quality assurance program be developed and implemented. Currently, there is little supervisory monitoring of dispatchers, no quality control monitoring of dispatcher performance (beyond trouble shooting when problems occur) or any thorough reviewing of internal management controls. The quality assurance program should include the monitoring of employee performance, the evaluation of procedures, the testing of equipment performance and the monitoring of unit performance standards.

30. RECOMMENDATION: Division Management develop and implement a Quality Assurance Program with input from not only Senior Dispatchers, but Division/Bureau Management and Patrol Bureau management as well. This program should cover the elements already mentioned, in addition to seeking advice on elements from other Dispatch Centers within and outside of CCSF.

Finding: Changes in policies and procedures for the Communications Section have historically been done without input from Dispatchers and Senior Dispatchers.

Condition: It is important that any major changes in policies or procedures that effect operations should have input from the personnel who must deal with these changes on a day to day basis. Without this input, operational problems can occur that policy planners may overlook or just not know about. It is important for all individuals involved in operations to give input, not only for efficiency and effectiveness, but for personnel morale as well.

31. RECOMMENDATION: Division Management develop a procedure that Dispatchers and Senior Dispatchers have input into major operational changes before they are implemented.

Finding: The average time callers hold on 911 Emergency Lines is 2.0 seconds. The average time callers hold on nonemergency lines is 52.1 seconds.

Condition: While the nonemergency 553-0123 lines average call answering is 52.1 seconds, it sometimes takes longer to get answered. The average number of Emergency 911 Calls are answered within two seconds. However, there are cases of 911 calls taking as much as thirty seconds or more to answer. The State suggests a "target" of answering all 911 calls within a maximum of 10 seconds. There are no State "target" guidelines for the answering of nonemergency calls.

Many of those interviewed said nonemergency calls (especially parking related calls) effect the dispatch and workload of patrol units. Statistics show that out of the 1,599 total nonemergency calls, 1,267 are handled by the Call Evaluators and are not dispatched. This number includes wrong numbers, crank calls, non-911 calls, and calls referred to other nonemergency agencies. Of the approximately 650 dispatched C Priority (nonemergency) calls a day, approximately 250 deal with parking problems. Thus, if all the parking calls were diverted out of the system, the C Priority Calls would drop by approximately 39% and the total number of nonemergency calls from both the 911 and 553-0123 lines would drop 13%. This would have a significant effect on nonemergency call waiting and response times.

32. RECOMMENDATION: Have the Chief of Police request that the Department of Traffic and Parking speed up their timetable in taking over and handling parking related calls. This should include a heavy advertising campaign to inform citizens of the proper numbers to call.

Finding: The 911 Emergency System has two types of translation services to use in case of non-English speaking callers. Most dispatchers interviewed had few or no problems using the services with some exceptions.

Condition: One translation service run by the State of California, Division of Telecommunications, has translators that speak Spanish, Cantonese, French, and two other common foreign languages. This service charges a nominal monthly fee. Dispatchers must first try and determine the language being spoken, connect with the center and carry on a three way conversation to obtain the necessary information. Dispatchers have commented that at times, the center has been busy and there have been delays.

The second service is provided by a nonprofit organization called C.A.L.L. and can translate over 100 foreign languages. This service is charged by the minute and causes some delays (depending on the language needed). As with the other service, Dispatchers must dial this service and have a three way communication to obtain the necessary information from the caller.

There have been no statistics kept on the amount of delay caused by each service, nor the specific problems associated with each service. Currently, Communications is conducting a survey to evaluate the translation service.

33. RECOMMENDATION: Start tracking translation service usage with statistics for length of call delay, problems with the service and associated costs to ascertain the cost benefit of the services and their eventual future use.

Finding: Call Priorities (A-B-C) are defined by Technical Services Division Management, and approved by the Chief of Police.

Condition: All changes to these definitions, must be approved by the Chief of Police before they are implemented. Specific calls (i.e., a 212 or a 411, etc.) follow general guidelines (see Appendix A) but can be changed by Technical Services Division Management. There are a number of specific calls that fall into an A, B, and/or C Priority. These calls are prioritized depending on the circumstances surrounding the call. However Call Evaluators are bound to follow the guidelines and definitions when making call determinations.

34. RECOMMENDATION: Call Evaluators should be monitored on a regular basis to ensure they are following the General Priority Guidelines and Priority Standards as established by the Division and approved by the Chief of Police.

Finding: Transfers of emergency calls to Fire Department Dispatch and Department of Health Dispatch are generally done in less than one minute with no problems occurring.

Condition: Both Fire Department Dispatch management and Department of Health Dispatch management have no problems with the transfer of calls from 911 Emergency Evaluators to their respective dispatchers. Statistics indicate a transfer rate of between 30 to 45 seconds.

NO RECOMMENDATION

Finding: There are no reported problems with the transfer of calls between the 911 Emergency System and the Police Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) System.

Condition: While the recent installation of the enhanced version of the 911 system has caused some very minor delays while Call Evaluators learn the system, and AT&T work out the bugs between the new system and the Police CAD system, there are no reported problems with the transfer of calls between the 911 Emergency System and the Police CAD System.

NO RECOMMENDATION

Finding: The average wait time on dispatching A Priority calls is two minutes and three seconds and the average time to dispatch B Priority calls is eight minutes and four seconds. Nonemergency C Priority calls are dispatched on the average of forty minutes and forty-one seconds.

Condition: Because there are no standards to evaluate performance times, there can be no conclusive evaluation made on these statistics. However, A and B Priority call times rank within the top three of the agencies as surveyed while nonemergency C Priority calls, fall in the middle of average times of other jurisdiction's reported times in Appendix A.

35. RECOMMENDATION: The Police Department should develop and implement dispatch standards (as well as patrol arrival standards) that are acceptable to Department Management, the Board of Supervisors and the Citizens of San Francisco.

Finding: On the average, only approximately 16.6 percent of all 911 calls, or 527 of 3,175 on a daily basis, are classified as Priority "A" or Priority "B." The remaining 2,648 calls are classified nonemergency and are handled as such.

Condition: Following the definitions of the Priorities A-B-C as previously stated, the Communications Center receives calls on the 911 lines for all matter of things having nothing to do with emergency situations. 911 is easy to remember and convenient to use, as was the original intention. The inside cover or emergency page of the telephone book displays the 911 number and by law, cannot display any other number. However, the emergency page does contain the notation "For Non-Emergency calls please use the appropriate 7-digit number". The public has not been properly educated as to the proper uses of 911 nor provided convenient access to the nonemergency telephone number for police services.

The use of 911 lines for nonemergency calls interferes with the processing of genuine emergency calls. The Call Management System used by the Communications Center for receiving and distributing 911 and 553-0123 calls contains programming routines that ensure the last available call evaluator will not be used for receiving a 553-0123 call. However, if that last available 911 is processing a 911 call that is not of an emergency nature, the purpose of that Call Management System feature is negated, and someone next calling 911 may be delayed because of the nonemergency call.

36. RECOMMENDATION: CCSF pursue the objective of having the police nonemergency number, 553-0123, displayed in prominent type on the opposite pages of telephone books listing the 911 emergency number pages. The achievement of this objective would be a significant step in reducing the number of nonemergency 911 calls received.
37. RECOMMENDATION: That the Police Department and the City make every attempt to educate the public on the capabilities and proper uses of the 911 system, through a public media campaign and a public information effort.
38. RECOMMENDATION: That the City initiate legislative action that would revise State laws to allow the telephone company to include the police nonemergency number on the 911 emergency page of the telephone book to help prevent the misuse of the 911 number.

D. Budgeting/Staffing Issues

Finding: Previous analysis indicates that the Section's problem with excessive absences previously discussed in Section B, is a major cause of inadequate staffing levels within Dispatch.

Condition: The Communications Section is at times inadequately staffed to meet citizen expectations in answering calls or in alleviating the undue stress on the part of Dispatchers. The Communications Section expends approximately 336 hours of overtime per pay period for call evaluation/dispatching staffing and other Section staffing. However, the analysis indicates occasions of inadequate staffing are not due to the lack of budgeted positions for communication dispatchers, but is due to the excessive absences of current personnel in these positions. After careful review (and with collaboration from the Officer in Charge of the Communications Section), it was determined that an average of 18 call evaluators/dispatchers for each Communication Center shift, on an annual basis, is adequate to ensure satisfactory service levels.

Determining the number of positions required to staff the Communications Center with an average of 18 communication dispatchers on duty on an annual basis is shown in Exhibit XI. This analysis shows that a total of 105 Communication Dispatcher positions are required to fully staff the Communications Center on an annual basis. In addition to staffing the Communications Center, Communication Dispatcher personnel are also used to staff the Records/Tapes Unit of the Communications Section.

The Communications Section is currently authorized a total of 116 communications dispatchers, including two communications dispatchers for the Records/Tapes Unit. Based on the analysis of the management and organizational structure of the Communications Section, five of the Communication Dispatcher positions should be converted to three Senior Communication Dispatcher positions to improve the performance of the Communications Center.

39. RECOMMENDATION: That authorized staffing for Communication Dispatchers (8238) be reduced from 116 authorized positions to 111 authorized positions and that three additional Senior Communication Dispatchers (8239) be authorized in the Police Department's FY 1991-92 budget.

Finding: The Communications Center processes many emergency calls and nonemergency calls from Spanish-speaking persons and, to a lesser extent, Chinese-speaking persons.

Condition: The procedure that non-bilingual call evaluators follow upon receiving such calls is, generally, to quick-dial translation services available from the State or other sources as described in Section C.

Exhibit XI

Communication Dispatcher Staffing Requirements

1. A "shift position" is defined as an eight hour time period to which work or an authorized absence is devoted. On a weekly basis there are 378 call evaluator/dispatcher shift positions required to be staffed as follows:

- a. 18 positions @ three shifts per day: 54 shift positions
- b. 54 positions @ seven days per week: 378 shift positions

2. To the 378 shift positions we add a factor of 60.5 shift positions for holidays, vacations, and sick days, calculated as follows:

Holidays:	13 days
Vacation:	15 days
Sick Pay:	<u>13 days</u>
Total	41 days

41 days equals 15.7 percent (rounded off to 16 percent) of the 261 annual workdays available (365 days minus 104 weekend or alternative days off equals 261 days). Sixteen percent of 378 shift positions is 60.5 shift positions.

3. To the 378 shift positions we add a factor of 34.4 shift positions to provide for 20 days of annual training and other administrative and operational requirements, calculated as follows:

20 days equals 9.1 percent of 220 available workdays (261 days minus 41 days for holidays, vacation, and sick pay days)
9.1 percent of 378 shift positions equals 34.4 shift positions

4. To the 412.4 shift positions (378 call evaluator shift positions plus 34.4 training shift positions) we add a factor of 51.6 shift positions to provide for a one hour meal break, calculated as follows:

20 hours equals 12.5 percent of 220 available workdays
2.5 percent of 412.4 shift positions equals 51.6 shift positions

5. The total number of shift positions to be staffed is 524.5, calculated as follows:

378.0 call evaluator/dispatcher shift positions
60.5 shift positions for absences
34.4 shift positions to accommodate training and other
operational or administrative requirements
51.6 shift positions to compensate for 1 hr meal break per shift
524.5 shift positions

524.5 shift positions divided by 5 shifts per staff person equals approximately 105 required staff positions.

Obtaining the services of a translator takes a few seconds. After the translator makes initial contact with the caller, he or she makes the translation for the 911 call evaluator, who remains on the line during the second language exchange. The 911 call evaluator must then ask questions through the translator to obtain the specific circumstances involved.

Having to use translation services inevitably delays the time required to understand enough of a request for assistance to initiate that assistance. In some instances, that delay involves life-threatening situations where each second increases peril to life. Increasing the number of bilingual communication dispatchers increases the probability of being able to more expeditiously process life-threatening and other time sensitive calls from persons who do not speak English.

Almost everyone interviewed recommended that persons who have an excellent command of the English language and are able to speak another high-use language, be targeted for recruitment as a communication dispatcher. The Communications Section currently has six Spanish-speaking and two Cantonese-speaking communication dispatchers who receive bilingual pay in accordance with the Salary Standardization Ordinance.

40. RECOMMENDATION: The Communications Section and the Civil Service Commission make special efforts to recruit prospective communication dispatchers who are bilingual.
41. RECOMMENDATION: The Police Department support the efforts of those communication dispatchers who are willing to learn a second language sufficiently to understand basic calls for assistance.

Finding: The civilianization of the Communications Section has been an effective and positive approach to staffing that unit.

Condition: Over the past twenty years, the call evaluation/dispatch function within the Police Department has evolved from a mere token number of civilians to the complete civilianization of that function, along with that of the first line management. With the introduction of advanced technology involved in the 911 system and Computer Assisted Dispatch in the 1980s, the belief evolved that the function of the call evaluator/dispatcher was too specialized for police officers, who would be required to spend considerable time learning the communications system and then at some future point, return to general police duties.

In 1989 the last police officers were removed from the position of call evaluator/dispatcher in the Communications Section. The FY 1990-91 budget authorizes

three police lieutenants and three police officers for the Communications Section. Actually assigned are one lieutenant, two police sergeants, and one police officer.

In the past, the civilian call evaluators/dispatchers were managed by officers who has not had the training or experience in communications work to understand the operational or technical aspects of the job. Moreover, as was discussed in Section A- Communications Section Management Turnover, section management have been rotated into and out of the Communications Section at the rate of one per year for the past fifteen years.

The effect of delaying and not completing the civilianization of the Communications Section (at the management level) is to withhold the kind of technical expertise, experience, and stability that is required to effectively manage the organization and provide a career development track for the call evaluator/dispatcher career field.

42. RECOMMENDATION: That the five remaining sworn officer positions currently in the Communications Section budget be transferred to other needed areas and that civilian equivalent positions be authorized as recommended in Recommendation 19 and that the Civil Service position of Manager, Communications Section, be created and filled as recommended in Recommendation 5 and that the Communications Section be reorganized per the suggested organization chart as illustrated in Exhibit XII.

Finding: In the recent past, eligibility lists for Communications Dispatchers (8238) have been prematurely exhausted, requiring the Communications Section to hire dispatchers on a provisional basis.


Condition: Although the list of eligible candidates for Civil Service classification 8238, Communication Dispatcher, was certified as of May 30, 1989, and is due to expire on May 30, 1992, as of January 18, 1991, there was one name of an original list of 47 eligible candidates on the certification list. Prior to the certification of the current list of eligible Communication Dispatchers on May 30, 1989, there were 24 limited tenure communication dispatchers employed by the Communications Section.

Due to the turnover in Communication Dispatchers during training, there is a continual need for hiring tested and qualified applicants.

According to the Civil Service Commission staff who administer examinations for classification 8238, the demand of City departments for current lists of persons examined and certified to fill vacant positions is greater than the Civil Service Commission is able to supply, due to insufficient staffing in the Examinations Section.


Exhibit XII

Communications Section Recommended Organization



Recommended authorized strength: 130 Positions

FY 1990-91 authorized strength: 133 Positions



The effect of not being able to hire from a Civil Service certification list is to require hiring, without testing, candidates on a provisional basis who have no Civil Service standing. When an examination is subsequently administered for the classification, those working on a provisional basis must take the examination like other new candidates. Limited tenure employees who don't pass the examination are required to be separated, resulting in a significant waste of training time.

43. RECOMMENDATION: The Police Department ask the Civil Service Commission Staff to start as soon as possible the proposed examination schedule for the Communication Dispatcher examination and that the Police Department request that the frequency of future examinations be increased to preclude the need to hire on a provisional basis.

Finding: The Communications Section has two persons assigned to its budget who are classified as 8238, Communication Dispatcher, but who are not working in that capacity.

Condition: There are two staff classified in the Communications Section budget as 8238, Communication Dispatcher, who are working in other positions. According to information provided, one such person is assigned to the Central Warrant Bureau of the Police Department. The other person is assigned to the Communications Section, however, instead of performing communication dispatching duties, this person performs duties primarily as the manager of Personal Instantaneous Communications (PIC) radios for the Police Department.

44. RECOMMENDATION: The Police Department should employ those designated as Communication Dispatchers in that capacity or the Department should have the positions redefined to reflect their current duties.

E. Patrol Bureau Issues

Finding: A number of Dispatchers and Senior Dispatchers have stated their jobs have become much more difficult and stressful due to the Patrol Bureau's decision to go to a Sector/Divisional Deployment Process.

Condition: Communications used to be referred to as Headquarters and was authorized to exercise supervisory authority over patrol units in the field when assigning calls. This authority included:

Assigning calls;
Making sure units were available for assignment;
Tracking units time's on breaks, meals and
administrative matters;
Assigning any units available to A-B-C Priority calls
depending on the situation and unit availability
regardless of sector or division boundaries.

However, due to Patrol Bureaus decision (as approved by the Chief of Police) to sectorize/divisionalize unit assignments per priority and align each Division into one radio channel, the decision was made to change the emphasis and authority of Communications responsibilities. In addition to these reasons, it was also felt by sworn officers that they should not have to report to a civilian dispatcher and so Watch Commanders and Field Sergeants were given the supervisory authority and responsibility over units in the field. The specific policy changes are explained in Appendix A.

NO RECOMMENDATION. NOTE: Because this is a Bureau of Patrol decision and is actually a patrol unit deployment issue, the scope of the project did not cover this area. However, we suggest this issue be studied in a future audit.

Finding: Sworn officers (including Bureau management), in the Patrol Bureau, as well as other Bureaus, do not fully understand the responsibilities of Communications, nor the factors that affect a dispatchers ability to perform his/her job effectively or efficiently.

Condition: Many of the officers in the field have had no contact (besides on the air use) with Communications. Thus, officers have no idea of the problems that occur when procedures are not followed or radios cannot be heard. They also cannot appreciate the job that is done in Communications, the role of the Dispatchers, nor the environment in which the Dispatchers work, by just interacting with Dispatch while in the field. This "knowledge gap" causes difficulties and misunderstandings between field personnel and communications personnel.

In addition, many officers (including senior level police department management) still have the "sworn vs civilian" attitudes that prohibit full communication and understanding of dispatch's role, responsibility and effectiveness.

45. RECOMMENDATION: Besides the training programs and written communications already recommended in earlier sections of the report, the Technical Services Division and Police Department Senior Management should study this situation and recommend ways to organizationally solve these problems. Internal public relations, training, mandatory tours, video films regarding Dispatch operations, etc. are alternatives that can be researched, developed and implemented.

F. 1987 Audit Follow-Up Issues

Finding: A management audit of the City's 911 System published by the Budget Analyst in August of 1987 made a total of 15 recommendations for improvement in the Communications Section. Of the 15 recommendations, five directly concern the Civil Service examination process and have not been implemented. Of the remaining 10 recommendations, six have been completely or partially implemented and four have not been implemented.

Condition: The Budget Analyst published an audit report on the City's 911 Emergency Services System in August of 1987. That audit report was directed primarily to the training presented in the Communication Dispatcher Course and the training and evaluation of supervisors assigned to monitor the work of the dispatcher trainees.

After reviewing the recommendations directly concerning the Civil Service examination, recommendation numbers one through five in Exhibit XIII, the Civil Service Commission staff responsible for examinations was interviewed. Based on this interview, observations of operations in the Communications Center, and interviews with dispatchers, it is believed that were recommendation numbers one through five implemented, the performance test portion of the Civil Service examination for Communication Dispatcher would be enhanced as a predictor of successful completion of the Communication Dispatcher course.

Recommendations seven and eight address the issue of communication dispatcher trainers and recommend the creation of a new intermediate level dispatch positions for that function. These recommendations have not been implemented. It is still a recommendation that more of the training responsibility be assigned to the Senior Communication Dispatchers.

Recommendations eleven and thirteen, which also have not been implemented, address the need for a training consultant and the need to fully staff the Communications Center, respectively. The Communications Center continues to be inadequately staffed and we have extensively reviewed the need for adequate staffing in Sections A, B and C of this report. It would also be desirable to obtain the services of a training consultant, whether in-house or by contract, to help improve training, and particularly to assist in the development and presentation of a continuing training program as mentioned earlier in this report.

46. RECOMMENDATION: Police Department Management implement the previous audit report's recommendations concerning adequate staffing for the Communications Center and for obtaining assistance in developing a continuing education/training program.

Exhibit XIII

Status of 1987 Audit Recommendations

<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
1. Normal background noise of the radio room should be added to the telephone calls received by applicants during the Police Communications Dispatcher performance test.	Not implemented. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) advises against adding background noise of the radio room. According to the CSC, the federal Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures forbid the use of a selection device that tests something that can be learned or adjusted to in a short time period on the job.
2. The Police Communications Dispatcher performance test should be revised to have applicants identify not only City street names, but also their location on a City map.	Not implemented. The CSC advises that familiarity with street names and location would not be an appropriate test element because locating streets on a map is not performed on the job.
3. The Police Communications Dispatcher performance test should be revised to have the applicants type the radio codes dictated from a pre-recorded tape rather than write them down; this covers an additional skill that is required on the job (listening and training simultaneously).	Not implemented. The CSC reports that the two skills involved, listening and typing, require separate testing devices to measure proficiency levels. The CSC also recommends that the minimum typing speed be increased to 45 words per minute.
4. To more accurately reflect the skills required on the job, applicants for the position of Police Communications Dispatcher should be required to type the relevant information obtained from the pre-recorded tape during the performance test.	Not implemented. The CSC reports that the two skills involved, listening and typing, require separate testing devices to measure proficiency levels.
5. Applicants for the position of Police Communications Dispatcher should be required to type the pre-recorded transmission of information verbatim from field units rather than write the information down since typing more accurately reflects the skills required on the job.	Not implemented. The CSC reports that the two skills involved, listening and typing, require separate testing devices to measure proficiency levels.

RECOMMENDATION

STATUS

6. The two Training Supervisors, Senior Police Communications Dispatchers, should be enrolled in a program to improve their supervisory skills and to obtain the skills and knowledge necessary for developing, implementing and evaluating training programs.

As reported by the Officer-in Charge (OIC) of the Communications Section, each of the nine permanent Senior Dispatchers has attended a one week course entitled "Civilian Supervisory Course, presented by Los Medanos College, at various times since appointment as a Senior Dispatcher. The nine original Senior Dispatchers attended a three day, in-house, course in Dispatch Room Supervision presented by a former Communications Section OIC. In addition, five of the Senior Dispatchers have attended a P.O.S.T.-accredited three day course entitled "Assertive Supervision" present by the San Francisco Police Academy.

7. The Civil Service Commission should be requested by the Police Department to develop the specifications for a new intermediate level dispatch position with a salary set between the Police Communications Dispatcher and the Senior Police Communications Dispatcher

Not implemented. The Communications Section Manager reports that up to 50 percent of the Police Communications Dispatchers are used as trainers and that they are compensated at the rate of \$1.40 when performing the training function. The Communications Section Manager believes that a new intermediate level dispatch position is unnecessary and would possibly create a destructive morale element into the Section's operation.

8. An appropriate number of successful candidates from the new intermediate communications dispatcher position examination should be selected as a permanent corps of Dispatch Training Officers.

Not implemented. The Communications Section has not sought to have a new intermediate communications dispatcher position established.

9. The Operations Supervisors who oversee the Communications Control Center should be given additional training in the areas of supervision and performance evaluation.

Implemented. At the time of the previous audit uniformed personnel were assigned to the Communications Section as Operations Supervisors. That function is now performed by Senior Communications Dispatchers. As previously stated, all Senior Communications Dispatchers have attended a one-week basic supervision training course.

RECOMMENDATION

STATUS

10. Performance evaluations of the Operations Supervisors, which have just been implemented this year by the Department, should be conducted at least once a year.

11. A training consultant should be hired to assist the training staff in their development of presentation methods and performance evaluation procedures with particular emphasis placed on the training of bilingual recruits.

12. At least one ethnic minority should be a part of the permanent training staff of the Dispatch Training Program.

13. The management of the Communications Control Center should establish the objective of fully staffing the dispatch function during the 18 months following the development of a new classroom training and on-the-job training program.

14. All uniformed police officers detailed throughout the year for 60 days of dispatch duties should be replaced by civilian Police Communications Dispatchers.

15. Those dispatch staff who voluntarily terminate employment should be debriefed in an effort to determine what action can be taken by management to reduce the rate of dispatcher turnover.

Implemented. Performance evaluations for Police Communications Dispatchers and Senior Police Communications Dispatchers assigned to the Communications Section have all been performed since November of 1989.

Not implemented. According to the Communications Section Manager, funds have not been made available for hiring a training consultant. Additionally, recruitment and testing for Communications Dispatcher, Bilingual, occurred only once, in 1985. According to CSC staff, there are no plans to recruit and test for that position in the future.

Implemented. Numerous ethnic minorities perform duties as communications trainers.

Not implemented. The Communications Section continues to use overtime, extensively, on a regular basis.

Implemented. Uniformed police officers are no longer detailed for communications dispatch duties.

Implemented as of December 6, 1990. The Captain in charge of the Technical Services Division, to whom the Communications Section Manager reports, directed that all individuals who resign voluntarily and wish to be interviewed be advised to contact the Commanding Officer of Personnel to schedule the interview.

47. RECOMMENDATION: Civil Service Commission staff implement the previous audit report's recommendations concerning the performance test portion of the Communication Dispatcher's examination.

G. Other Audit Issues

Finding: There is a lack of formal and continuous communications or coordination between the Police Dispatch, Fire Dispatch or Public Health Dispatch within CCSF.

Condition: This lack of communication and coordination precludes the possibilities of sharing resources, personnel, information, experiences and/or standardizing procedures that could save CCSF thousands and possibly tens of thousands of dollars. One example is the use of statistical centers of operations (in the Department of Public Health) for distributing paramedic units within their zones may be very useful for the police department in optimizing their placement of patrol units. Another example is the money saved in civilianizing the police dispatch might also occur if civilianization occurred in the Fire Department. At the very least this alternative should be studied.

48. RECOMMENDATION: That each dispatch agency meet on a quarterly basis and that the Mayor's Office facilitate the coordination of the dispatch centers and explore issues such as personnel, procedures, policies, facilities, equipment and procurement that could be better utilized and could save CCSF some expenditures.

Finding: Until recently there has been no facility management studies done for the efficient use and proper operation of the communications center.

Condition: In December of 1990, a 911 Architectural Study was conducted by the Bureau of Architecture, Department of Public Works at the request of the Police Planning Division. This was the first such study done in many years. The study identified a number of serious deficiencies in the facilities that house the Dispatch Center and the actual room itself.

Using architectural and ergonomics standards, the report identified seismic, architectural, lighting, acoustical, work station, temperature, asbestos and personnel and procedure problems. The report then identified solutions to these problems and developed four schemes (plans) to solve the problems. Because of time, money, and the lack of a cohesive and future long range plans for Communications, one of the options was chosen as the best short term solution. However, due to funding and timing problems, the recommendations have not been fully implemented

It was stressed in the report that a long term solution must be developed to address the critical problems that face the current facilities.

49. RECOMMENDATION: The short term recommendations as outlined in the Architectural Study should be implemented immediately. By using current funds that exist for the project and supplementing them with the 911 equipment reimbursement monies that were received from the State (out of salaries), there would be enough funds to do the job.
50. RECOMMENDATION: That a long range plan be developed immediately to address the critical problems of placement of the facility and take into account issues such as 911 and Dispatch backup, the combining of dispatch centers, and the eventual replacement of the hardware and upgrading of the CAD software of Communications.
51. RECOMMENDATION: The Chief of Police give responsibility for facility renovation, purchasing, facility planning, equipment planning, etc. to one individual who would be responsible and authorized to coordinate these many tasks to assure successful completion.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

A. Summary Conclusions

In the absence of state, federal or local standards to judge the 911 operations statistical performance by, it is difficult to objectively evaluate 911 operations into an excellent, good, fair or poor label. The primary question of "Is the 911 System serving the public well?" cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. On one hand, the statistics as presented, in comparison with other jurisdictions, show that CCSF is within reasonable times of 911 processing and dispatching. However, there are a number of problems and operational procedures that cause potential problems within the section. Many of these problems are historical in nature, yet many others stem from current operations problems. A number of perceived problems deal with the police response times, and not with the 911 system at all. These issues need to be dealt with in a separate report.

However, there are a number of management and operational problems with the 911 System that can be resolved, and those are amply discussed in the study. Also, there are a number of positive activities that are being implemented in the section as well. By implementing the recommendations made in this report, the Police Department can improve the 911 system operations and limit the probability of errors and problems from occurring. However, the Police Department, the Police Commission, and members of the Community need to assist in the development of the standards and goals that the unit will be compared against to evaluate its performance, and to answer the question "Is the 911 System serving the public well?".

B. Noteworthy Accomplishments

While it is the nature of management audits to focus on the areas that need improvement or that lack adequate management controls, there are a number of positive practices and accomplishments regarding the CCSF 911 System and Police Dispatch that were discovered in the course of this study. The significant ones include:

Civilianizing the Dispatch and Evaluator positions. This created specialists in the area of dispatch and saved the police Department and City significant money.

Developing and implementing the Senior Dispatch position. This further cut the need for sworn officers in the communications facility (thus saving money), developed a more homogeneous environment within the unit but also created some civilian management controls and created a career path for the civilian dispatchers.

Involving the Communications Unit in a more strategic and effective role with major events that occur, including earthquakes, large demonstrations, parades, etc. The Unit has been cited for excellent service during a number of these events.

The formation of the internal Dispatchers Task Force to give input into policies and procedures regarding the Unit and to help make recommendations to police management on improvements.

The decision to have Seniors report to the Lieutenant in charge of Communications, so there is a strong chain of command and an improved communication link between police management and dispatch supervisors.

The retaining of Lt. Fortner as Officer in Charge of the Communications Unit in the last officer rotation. The consistency in command will help reduce past problems of inconsistent practices and policies. Also, Lt. Fortner has the trust and respect of most of the Senior Dispatchers and Dispatchers interviewed.

The moves to improve the center's facilities and the involvement of the Police Planning Division and the Bureau of Architecture in the planning of the facility needs.

The continuing effort to improve the Senior Dispatchers Job Descriptions and Roles within the Unit and the positive moves in trying to establish a quality assurance program within the unit.

The dedication and hard work exhibited by many of the Senior Dispatchers and Dispatchers that the audit team observed during the interviews and the gathering of data. These staff members perform a tremendous job under sometimes very stressful and difficult situations.

C. Issues Needing Further Study

Due to the limited time necessary to complete the audit, a number of issues were not thoroughly researched and reported on. However, these issues are of significant scope to warrant further study and it is recommended they be followed up. These issues are:

The current policy (Bulletin 89-03) and procedures of not crossing sector and division integrity on B and C priority calls and the result this policy has on the time it takes to answer these calls, the impact this policy has had on the quality of police responsiveness and time effectiveness, the impact on communications procedures and dispatch, as well as other associated issues.

The current computer hardware and software uses and the plans and needs for updating the equipment.

The feasibility and associated cost savings of combining police and fire and possibly health department dispatch into one modern dispatch facility staffed by civilians. If not this combined facility, then a long range plan of what to do with current deficiencies in the police communications facility.

APPENDIX A

SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT
FIELD RESPONSE TO DISPATCHED ASSIGNMENTS POLICY
(89-3 SECTOR/DIVISION BOUNDARIES POLICY)



TRAINING BULLETIN

89-03

SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT

07/11/89

FIELD RESPONSE TO DISPATCHED ASSIGNMENTS

Communications shall not exercise supervisory or management authority over field units. This is the responsibility of field Supervisors of Patrol and other Bureaus. For this reason, members shall refer to Communications with the title **DISPATCH** instead of the previously used "headquarters".

Communications shall dispatch field units to respond to waiting assignments in the following order:

A-Priority Assignments: (Communications shall first broadcast waiting A-priority assignments on district radio channels, as required by General Order F-2)

1. 10-8 Sector unit (A *sector unit* is a marked unit assigned primary patrol responsibility for the sector. Foot beats, patrol wagons, traffic, and other specialized units are not considered sector units.)
2. 10-8 district unit (any sector unit from within the district).
3. District unit 10-7 on a lower priority assignment (General Order D-11, Rule 19, requires units to respond to higher priority assignments when preempted by Communications.)
4. District supervisor (Supervisors shall perform the role of *cover unit* in responding to backup calls from other units, and to stabilize A-priority assignments where no other district unit can make a timely response. A sector unit will be dispatched to take a report and free the Supervisor as soon as one becomes available.)
5. Any unit within the district.
6. Any unit outside of the district.

B-Priority Assignments:

1. 10-8 sector unit.
2. 10-8 district unit.
3. Communications broadcasts the assignment and then waits for the next 10-8 sector or district unit.

C-Priority Assignments:

1. 10-8 sector unit.
2. Communications broadcasts the assignment then waits for the sector unit to become 10-8. Field supervisors may direct their non-sector units to handle waiting C-priority assignments.

Communications shall no longer:

- Call a unit more than twice for a waiting assignment.
- Call district stations to find units.
- Accept telephone numbers for 10-8 units in lieu of maintaining radio contact, except in special situations.
- Consider units 10-8 when they are 10-7 on activities that have traditionally been considered "10-8 assignments", such as 585's, 587's, and reports.
- Be held responsible for the allocation of field units, and shall not initiate or become involved in disputes between field units, supervisors or Watch Commanders over the reassignment of units.
- Notify Watch Commanders or supervisors regarding waiting assignments, other than when a waiting assignment is broadcast.
- Make calls to District Stations regarding late entry of Lineup information at the beginning of each watch. When no units are available because Lineup information was not entered, Communications shall make a log entry under 2R04 (e.g. - "NO LINEUP FROM COMPANY X"), ensure that all waiting assignments have been Broadcast, and then follow the remainder of the appropriate procedure described above for A, B, and C-priority dispatching.

Communications shall:

- Use the new CAD entry No-Contact whenever a Dispatcher is unable to contact a unit on the radio. (The No-Contact entry replaces the term "failure-to-respond". Its appearance in the CAD History of a unit or a Complaint does not imply fault.)
- Log all No-Contact entries of field Supervisors and Watch Commanders under 2R04, for daily review by PB/SOB Staff.
- Begin calling units for Waiting assignments 15 minutes after the start of their watch, unless informed otherwise by a field Supervisor.
- Continue to dispatch assignments to units until they change their status to 10-7E (which Training Bulletin 88-5 allows no sooner than 30 minutes before the end of a unit's watch).
- Log all deviations from the requirements of Training Bulletin 88-5 in CAD 2R04 for daily review by PB/SOB staff, regardless of the reason.
- Call any unit that has been 7M for over 45 minutes when assignments are waiting.

District Watch Commanders and Supervisors shall:

- Be in constant radio contact with Communications, and ensure prompt and proper response to radio assignments by their subordinates (General Order D-10).
- Continuously monitor assigned radio channels, and routinely review MVT and station terminal CAD displays in the course of supervising their units.
- Use the MVT to review waiting assignments within the same priority, to ensure that units are responding to more urgent assignments first.
- Use the MVT or station terminal to ensure the proper deployment of their units, by monitoring the number of waiting assignments in each sector, and reassign units from less busy sectors as needed throughout the watch.
- Routinely review No-Contact entries while supervising their units. (Use the RF/QUH command. For a report of all Districts, enter NC for the unit ID, or for a single District, 3A NC, 3B NC, etc.)
- Enter Line-ups into CAD at least 30 minutes prior to the start of each watch (Training Bulletin 88-5).
- Complete their field roll-call (Lineups) within 15 minutes after the start of each Watch (Training Bulletin 88-5).
- Resolve any difficulties on a service channel, admin channel, or over the phone - *not on the Dispatch channel*.

Field units shall:

- Immediately notify Communications of any changes in their status, including advising the dispatcher of a status that has been entered incorrectly (Training Bulletin 88-5).
- Notify Communications when, due to the sensitive nature of certain operations, they need to be out of radio contact for short intervals. Units shall state the expected length of time involved and then promptly notify Communications when they resume contact. Dispatchers will log such broadcasts in CAD under the unit's History. Sensitive operations can include interview of juveniles or rape victims, narcotics investigations, and surveillances.
- Not dispute CAD entries with Communications dispatchers - over the radio, by phone, or in person.
- Take 7M no longer than 45 minutes, and maintain radio contact with Communications while on 7M.

7M procedures are as follows:

- **Units with MVT's:** Shall use the MVT to determine if the conditions described below are met. If so, they notify the Dispatcher for approval, then enter their 7M status and location into the MVT.
- **Units without MVT's:** Shall request 7M from the Dispatcher, who will review the status of other assigned units. If the conditions described below are met, the Dispatcher grants the unit 7M.
- **Dispatchers** shall permit Units to go 7M according to the rules in Patrol Bureau Order 88-03. Units must obtain permission from their supervisor to override these rules.
 - 3-4 sector units on the Watch:..... 1 allowed 7M at a time.
 - 5-6 sector units on the Watch:..... 2 allowed 7M at a time.
 - 7-8 sector units on the Watch:..... 3 allowed 7M at a time.
 - Unit's last hour of Watch:..... No 7M allowed.
 - 100 units:..... 1 allowed 7M at a time.

APPENDIX B
COMPARISON MATRIX OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
9-1-1 OPERATIONS

APPENDIX B

COMPARISON SURVEY MATRIX

Comparison Matrix of Adjoining City 911 Systems

Part of the audit scope included analyzing the objectives, operations, and facilities of adjoining cities and counties to compare the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the 911 service to that of CCSF. The review included telephone interviews and/or site visits to comparative city/counties to determine the purpose of the 911 mission, the personnel requirements of the positions, the operational aspects of the system and its integration with other emergency services, and the appropriateness of the facilities.

The matrix in Appendix B identifies the significant aspects of the 911 function to perform a comparative analysis of the services of those provided by CCSF to that of adjoining cities and counties. The City of Los Angeles was also reviewed because of its size.

Mission, Goals, Objectives, and Organization

The review of the localities disclosed that all cities and counties had their emergency mission identified and provided police and fire referral services. Staffing varied by location, depending on the size and makeup of the locality. Most counties did not have budgetary fiscal data identified by line item for the 911 system. In most cases Police services were on site; but fire, emergency medical service, poison control, suicide prevention, etc. were referred to the appropriate agency.

Personnel, Recruitment, Training, and Compensation

All localities had sufficient minimum requirements for entry level personnel but varied in respect to required psychological examinations. Formal classroom training hours were adequate and in most instances was also P.O.S.T certified. The cities generally had extensive on-the-job training by a senior dispatcher that covered three to nine months. Thereafter a dispatcher/operator was allowed to operate independently.

Salary, Morale Enhancers, and Turnover

Salary range had considerable variation between \$25,000 and \$52,000, however most localities had management tools to increase morale. Several cities had implemented programs such as the use of police health and fitness facilities, welfare concern programs, and employee participation in management. The ability of employees to participate in management was considered the most significant factor used by the localities to boost morale and job satisfaction.

Annual staff turnover rates ran from one to twelve percent. The circumstances differed so much by locality that the specific cause of the rates could not be established. Many localities mentioned that staff turnover usually declined to a low level after employees completed probation.

Quality Assurance and Employee Appraisals

All localities were concerned with the quality of the operations of the 911 systems and most had informal quality assurance programs to monitor effectiveness. Generally a supervisor or reviewer would randomly monitor actual calls or tapes to evaluate if procedures were followed and that services were provided effectively. Some localities would call 911 users or send out questionnaires to monitor if the public was satisfied with the service.

It was noted that most cities did not have formal annual evaluations or appraisal procedures to assess individual operators/dispatchers performance. However, most agencies believe annual performance evaluations are necessary to identify and provide input to operators for providing better services to the public and are working on this issue.

Operations

The survey of operations at the various localities, included obtaining certain statistical data from the communication managers. The calls received per hour varied from 1 to 688 with a drop rate ranging from zero to ten percent. Dispatch time for emergency or high priority calls was usually immediate or within a few seconds. The normal response time for nonemergency calls ranged from 10 minutes to 2 to 4 hours depending on the locality and the quantity of calls that were on hold. Some localities would not commit to the time required to respond to a nonemergency call. They indicated that there was a significant variation and response was based on the number of calls waiting and the time of day that a request was received.

The same operator/dispatcher received complaints and dispatched units on the same calls at Alameda, San Mateo, Los Angeles, and San Jose. However, Oakland, Sacramento, and Santa Clara County had separate receipt (call evaluators) and dispatch personnel. It was noted however that operators or dispatcher were qualified and received training in both areas. The segregation of the receipt of call and dispatch function was a matter of organization at the locality.

Prioritization of Calls

The localities reviewed had consistently established priority systems in dispatching calls. Generally a 1 through 3 system was used to assign priority or emergency status to calls. For illustration, priority was usually categorized as follows:

- 1 - high priority urgent, life threatening, serious injury potential, fleeing felony suspect (e.g., explosion, or robbery in progress).
- 2 - urgent but not immediate emergency, property damage and in progress events with violence potential (e.g., suspect is on premises).
- 3 - cold reports only, no danger to life or property involved, (e.g., mail and telephone reports, abandoned automobiles, parking problems, etc.)

Bi-Lingual Capacity

The review of the various localities disclosed that there was bi-lingual capability at all of the localities except Sacramento. The predominant second language at these centers was Spanish. The use of bi-lingual operators was more due to center having someone on hand with bi-lingual ability. The units did not necessarily recruit for bi-lingual operators, although some paid differentials for foreign language proficiency. If an operator received a call in a foreign language, he would refer the call to the appropriate person on staff or to the telephone (ATT) language center if no one was available.

Facilities

Facilities were generally adequate with respect to lighting. Most of the facilities had indirect lighting which was subdued and adjustable to the comfort levels of the operators. Partitions, noise suppression, and density in most instances was adequate for the operation of the facility except for Sacramento which was described as dense. Chairs were ergonomically adjustable, as well as computer keyboards, however the screens on certain Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) systems were limited depending on the age of the equipment. The equipment and software was identified at the various centers. Overall, the communication managers were satisfied with the facilities and equipment provided, with the exception of Los Angeles whose facility was relatively old and four floors underground.

APPENDIX B - COMPARISON SURVEY MATRIX

	San Francisco	Alameda	Oakland	San Mateo	Sacramento	Los Angeles	San Jose	Santa Clara County
Sworn Personnel	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Morale Enhancers	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
<hr/>								
OPERATIONS								
Quality Assurance Program	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Formal Performance Standards	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
Equipment:								
Telephone	ATT	PacBell	PacBell	PacBell	PacBell/ATT	PacBell	PacBell	Mitel
Software	CMS	Proprietary	Positron ACD	DWN PBX	1A2 Key Sys	SL-1 Positron DEC 1170	Positron	Proprietary
CAD	PSW3	PRC System	Proprietary	Tandem	VAX 8530		PRC	Kustom
Software	TIBERON	PRC	Data Genrl	System Concepts	PRC	Sys Devel (Unisis)	PRC	Proprietary
Priority System Established	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Average Calls per Hour	142	1	125	10	48	688	42	14
Dropped Calls	N/A	0	8%	0	2%	10%	5%	0
Non-Emergency Response Time * Would not state time	40 Min	10 Min	35 Min	Varies*	2-4 Hours	2-3 Hours	Varies*	Varies*
In House Bi-Lingual Capability	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Answers and Dispatches Emergency Units at same time	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
Annual Staff Turnover	7%	1%	9%	13%	10%	13%	3%	3%
Administrative Support Available	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
Updates and Effectively Communicates Changes and provides Data	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

APPENDIX B - COMPARISON SURVEY MATRIX

	San Francisco	Alameda	Oakland	San Mateo	Sacramento	Los Angeles	San Jose	Santa Clara County
FACILITIES DESCRIPTIONS								
Average Number of Personnel on Floor	23	4	17	4	25	60	25	12
Lighting Adequacy: Direct (D), Indirect (I)	D	I	D	I	I	I	I	I
Windows	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Partitions/Noise Supression	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N
Density	Dense	Moderate	Dense	Open	Dense	Moderate	Open	Open
Ergonomic Chairs	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adjustable Computer/CAD: (K-Keyboard, S-Screen, N=None)	K	K	S	K	K	N	K,S	K
Overall Facilities Adequacy	Poor	Fair	Good	Good	Good	Poor	Good	Good

SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE



POLICE DEPARTMENT

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

HALL OF JUSTICE

850 BRYANT STREET

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94103

WILLIS A. CASEY

February 13, 1991

City and County of San Francisco
Audits Division
160 South Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA

Subject: Response to Management Audit of the 911 Emergency System

Sirs:

This is a brief and preliminary response to the recent audit of the 9-1-1 Emergency System performed by the Audits Division of the City Controller's Office and the Budget Analyst's Office of the Board of Supervisors.

We would first like to extend our appreciation to those persons involved with this audit. We are confident that the audit recommendations will assist in the enhancement of our City's 9-1-1 system.

Many of the Audit's recommendations have already been considered and/or initiated. Specific responses can be provided upon request.

Budgetary recommendations appear to be the most difficult recommendations to implement. Present budget restrictions will dictate the feasibility of these recommendations.

Upon a more thorough review of the recommendations of this audit, appropriate resolutions will be seriously considered. As suggested, the resolutions will be developed with cooperation between dispatchers, management, and appropriate City Departments and/or agencies.

The San Francisco Police Department Administration will continue to consider the enhancement of the City's 9-1-1 system a high priority.

Sincerely,

Willis A. Casey
Chief of Police



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